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ABSTRACT 
Although many people do not take Islamophobia as a serious issue, Islamophobia is 
becoming one of the leading threats against peace and unity in Europe. Islamophobia is not 
just something that happened over the night, it is a series of hate crime, discrimination, 
and vilification that accumulated in past years against Muslims in Europe.  
 
The diploma thesis presents the impact of the media in Austria and Slovenia with the aim 
of focusing on acceptances of Islam in both countries as so outline the extent to which 
Islamophobia reaches. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is an examination of media 
interference in the religious world of Austria and Slovenia.  
 
The paper also presents an explanation of Islam as a religion, for an easier understanding 
of the concept of Islamophobia, as so the teaching of the Holy Quran in order to clarify 
misconceptions about Islam.  
 
The thesis addresses the emergence of Islamophobia in both countries and the role and 
impact of the media on it. We use a descriptive, historical, and comparative method. In the 
research part, we focus on examing the Parliamentary election 2018 in Slovenia and the 
Parliamentary election 2017 in Austria in order to present the leading causes of the victory 
of a particular political party and their connection with Islamophobia. Throughout the 
research, we found that the media have a huge impact, generally on society, but when it 
comes to certain topics, such as Islamophobia, data shows that in both countries there are 
media with a high rate of discrimination and hatred towards Muslims. The media were used 
in a way to produce fear and rejection of Muslims by society in both countries. In order to 
show the general influence of the media, especially on the rate of Islamophobia, we 
presented the role of the media during the elections and came to the results that the media 
are actually one of the key factors in succeeding of political parties and in increasing 
Islamophobia in countries. Thus, the Austrian media were the main source of information 
and coverage of political campaigns, which advocated the fight against so-called political 
Islam, and thus presented their campaign as an ideal protector of citizens in the fight 
against Islam. Unfortunately, data on media consumption display the huge public interest 
which indicates that the media have not only succeeded in attracting viewers but have also 
succeeded in their ultimate goal, influencing society to vote for parties that support anti-
Islamic acts. In the case of Slovenia, we have the same scenario, where right-wing political 
party owns certain media and use them especially in time of elections to promote their 
right-wing policy of anti-migrations and anti-Islamic aims. Even though we do not have data 
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about media consumption in this case, still media have succeeded to influence society to 
vote for the party that advocates anti-migration policy. 
 
Keywords: Islamophobia, Europe, Austria, Islam, Slovenia, media, religion, the Holy Quran, 
The Parliamentary election, Anti-migration policy. 
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POVZETEK 
VPLIV MEDIJEV NA PORAST ISLAMOFOBIJE V PRIMERJALNI PERSPEKTIVNI 
MED AVSTRIJO IN SLOVENIJO 
 
Čeprav islamofobije veliko ljudi ne jemlje kot resno vprašanje, postaja ena od vodilnih 
groženj miru in enotnosti v Evropi. Islamofobija ni samo nekaj, kar se je zgodilo čez noč, 
temveč je niz zločinov, storjenih iz sovraštva in diskriminacije, ki so se nabirala v preteklih 
letih proti muslimanom v Evropi. 
 
V diplomski nalogi je predstavljen vpliv medijev v Avstriji in Sloveniji z namenom, da se 
osredotočijo na sprejemanje islama v obeh državah, saj tako orisujejo obseg doseganja 
islamofobije. V ospredju te teze je torej preučevanje medijskega vmešavanja v verski svet 
Avstrije in Slovenije.  
 
Predstavljena je tudi razlaga islama kot religije za lažje razumevanje pojma islamofobije, s 
čimer bi razjasnili napačne predstave o islamu. Teza obravnava pojav islamofobije v obeh 
državah ter vlogo in vpliv medijev nanjo. V nalogi uporabljamo opisno, zgodovinsko in 
primerjalno metodo.  
 
V raziskovalnem delu se osredotočamo na preučitev parlamentarnih volitev leta 2018 v 
Sloveniji in parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017 v Avstriji, saj želimo predstaviti glavne vzroke 
za zmago določene politične stranke in njihovo povezavo z islamofobijo. Skozi raziskavo 
smo ugotovili, da imajo mediji velik vpliv na družbo. Vendar ko gre za določene teme, kot 
je islamofobija, podatki kažejo, da v obeh državah obstajajo mediji z visoko stopnjo 
diskriminacije in sovraštva do muslimanov. Mediji so bili uporabljeni na način, da so 
ustvarili strah in zavrnitev muslimanov s strani družbe v obeh državah. Da bi pokazali vpliv 
medijev, zlasti na stopnjo islamofobije, smo predstavili vlogo medijev med volitvami. Pri 
tem smo prišli do rezultata, da so mediji eden ključnih dejavnikov za uspeh političnih strank 
in povečanje islamofobije v državah. Tako so bili avstrijski mediji glavni vir informacij in 
poročanja o političnih kampanjah, ki so zagovarjale boj proti tako imenovanemu 
političnemu islamu, hkrati pa so s svojo kampanjo sebe predstavile kot idealnega zaščitnika 
državljanov v boju proti islamu. Podatki o porabi medijev kažejo, da je medijem uspelo 
doseči svoj končni cilj – vplivali so na družbo, ki bo glasovala za stranke, ki podpirajo 
protiislamska dejanja. V primeru Slovenije imamo enak scenarij, kjer ima desničarska 
politična stranka v lasti določene medije in jih zlasti v času volitev uporablja za spodbujanje 
njihove politike proti migracijam in islamskim ciljem. Čeprav v tem primeru nimamo 
podatkov o porabi medijev, je medijem vseeno uspelo vplivati na družbo in podpreti 
stranko, ki zagovarja protimigracijsko politiko. 
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Ključne besede: islamofobija, Evropa, Avstrija, Islam, Slovenija, mediji, religija, Sveti Koran, 
Parlamentarne volitve, Anti-migracijska politika. 
 
V diplomskem delu obravnavamo pojav islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji ter glavne vplive, 
ki so povzročili ta pojav. Islam je kot religija že dlje časa prisotna v Avstriji in večjih konfliktov 
z oblastmi v zvezi z njo ni bilo. Prvi vidnejši konflikt se je pojavil v času parlamentarnih 
volitev leta 2017, ko so se nekatere politične stranke odločile, da bo eden od ciljev strank 
boj proti tako imenovanemu »političnemu islamu«. Ta boj je dal posameznim političnim 
strankam pravico, da se prek medijev vmešavajo v pomen islama. Zato bomo v tem primeru 
raziskovali vpliv medijev na rezultate parlamentarnih volitev leta 2017. 
 
Če Slovenijo primerjamo z Avstrijo, je islam kot religija v Sloveniji šele na začetku 
vključevanja v državo. Leta 1960 so muslimani prvič zaprosili za dovoljenje za gradnjo 
mošeje, vendar so ga dobili šele 2015. Z gradnjo mošeje v Ljubljani je tako nastalo prvo 
islamsko središče in hkrati druga mošeja. Prvo mošejo v Sloveniji so leta 1914 zgradili 
bošnjaški vojaki, ki so se borili na strani Avstro-Ogrske. Poleg gradnje druge džamije je 
ogromno pozornosti v politiki, zlasti desnih strank, in v medijih, predvsem slovenskega 
desničarskega medija Nova24TV, pritegnilo ime ulice, to je »Ulica mošeje«, kjer stoji 
džamija. Kot vemo, se desničarska stranka v Evropi navadno zavzema za strogo begunsko 
politiko in njihovo zavračanje na evropskih tleh. Tudi Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS) 
je med parlamentarnimi volitvami leta 2018 predstavljala prihod migrantov kot nevarnost 
za slovenske državljane, s čimer je zbirala politično podporo. Vendar je povezava med 
migracijami in islamom v desnih medijih veliko bolj vzpostavljena na islamofobni način. 
 
Razlog zakaj želimo predstaviti problematiko omenjene teme, je v tem, da smo kot študenti 
Fakultete za upravo, ki se ukvarjamo z upravljanjem javnega sektorja, pridobili sposobnost 
kritičnega in analitičnega razmišljanja. Zaradi tega se zavedamo nujnih multidisciplinarnih 
sprememb, ko gre za islamofobijo kot eno od perečih težav v družbi. Kot bodoči mladi 
voditelji prevzemamo odgovornosti pri sprejemanju pomembnih odločitev o družbenih, 
političnih in pravnih vidikih, ki predstavljajo nepogrešljiv delež v politiki in javni upravi. Prav 
slednje predstavljata regulacijo volilnega sistema in medijskega prostora. 
 
Namen diplomske naloge je raziskati vlogo medijev in njihov način prikazovanja islama v 
Avstriji in Sloveniji, predvsem zaradi koristi držav kot tudi miru in enotnosti v obeh. 
Mediji v sodelovanju z desnimi političnimi strankami poskušajo prikazati strah pred 
muslimani in hkrati svojo stranko predstavljajo kot zaščitnika pred valom muslimanov, ki 
prihajajo v državo. Poleg tega desničarske stranke s svojim programom ustvarjajo 
predsodke do islama in muslimanov. Zato je v pričujoči diplomski nalogi naš cilj prikazati 
dokaze teh trditev. 
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Med raziskovanjem se bomo osredotočili na naslednje cilje: 
- na konceptualno-teoretični ravni izpostavili različne koncepte islamofobije, kjer 
bomo predstavili različna mnenja avtorjev o islamofobiji; 
- predstavili zgodovinsko ozadje islama in izrazili svoje osebno mnenje o islamu kot 
religiji; 
- pokazali, kako se je muslimanska vera sprva vključila v kulturo Avstrije in Slovenije 
ter tako pridobila svoje pravice z zakonom; 
- predstavili pojem medijev in njihov vpliv na družbo; 
- raziskali vpliv medijev na porast islamofobije; 
- predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v Avstriji in Sloveniji; 
- predstavili vpliv medijev na rezultate v obeh državah. 
 
V nadaljevanju diplomske naloge bomo uporabili različne raziskovalne pristope: 
- z opisno metodo opisali glavne pojme, ki jih najdemo v delu in so povezani s temo; 
- na teoretični ravni predstavili islamofobijo, kjer bomo opisali različne pristope več 
avtorjev; 
- s pomočjo zgodovinske metode ugotovili, kako so mediji vplivali na islamofobijo in 
kako jo razumemo skozi zgodovino; 
- z uporabo metode sinteze v teoretičnem delu dobili odgovore na vprašanji, zakaj je 
islamofobija v porastu ter kako so na njen porast vplivale avstrijske in slovenske 
politične stranke; 
- z analizo sekundarnih podatkov predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v 
Avstriji in Sloveniji; 
- s primerjalno metodo primerjali podobnosti in razlike med Avstrijo in Slovenijo. 
 
V nalogi smo si zastavili dve hipotezi: 
- Vpliv medijev na porast islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji je bil med volitvami zelo 
izrazit. 
- Muslimani so sami odgovorni za nastanek islamofobije v Avstriji in Sloveniji zaradi 
pretiranega priseljevanja v državi. 
V zadnjem delu diplomske naloge bomo predstavili različne dokaze, s katerimi bomo 
potrdili ali ovrgli hipotezi. 
 
V drugem poglavju diplomske naloge bomo s pomočjo zgodovinske metode predstavili 
pomembna dejstva o islamu, njegovem zgodovinskem ozadju in glavnem viru, to je Svetem 
Koranu, kot tudi vključevanje islama v avstrijsko in slovensko družbo. V tretjem bomo z 
opisno metodo opisali definicijo teoretskih konceptov ter predstavili vzrok in pojav 
islamofobije v obeh državah. V četrtem bomo s pomočjo teoretične metode opredelili 
koncept medijev, njegovo vlogo in vpliv na družbo tako v Avstriji kot tudi v Sloveniji. Peto 
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in šesto poglavje imata isti koncept; v obeh bomo s pomočjo sekundarne analize podatkov 
predstavili rezultate parlamentarnih volitev v prej omenjenih državah in vpliv medijev na 
te rezultate. V sedmem poglavju bomo predstavili podobnosti in razlike med Avstrijo in 
Slovenijo. V zadnjem pa bomo na kratko obrazložili cilj diplomske naloge in predstavili 
rezultate, s katerimi bomo potrdili ali ovrgli hipotezi. 
 
V zaključnem delu diplomske naloge se z analizo avstrijskih parlamentarnih volitev leta 
2017 dotaknemo praktičnega primera vpliva medijev. Naš cilj je pokazati, koliko politikov 
se je pojavilo v medijih, koliko potencialnih volivcev si je ogledalo volitve, kako so v medijih 
uporabljali medijske in islamofobne vsebine za zmago na volitvah ter širili strah in trepet 
med avstrijskim prebivalstvom, da bi predstavili svojo stranko kot idealno zaščito 
avstrijskega ljudstva pred islamom in islamizacijo. 
 
Vprašanja priseljevanja, nadzora meje in antiislama so bila glavna ideologija vseh treh 
strani. Prvič, zmagovalna stranka ÖVP (ang. The Austrian People’s Party) z 31-odstotnim 
deležem glasov, ki jo vodi Sebastian Kurz, lahko svojo zmago pripiše njegovi protimigracijski 
in antimuslimanski kampanji, ki se je popolnoma zlila z medijsko vsebino, polno sovražnih 
stereotipov. Drugič, SPÖ (ang. The Social Democratic Party of Austria) je bil eden glavnih 
podpornikov stranke FPÖ (ang. The Freedom Party of Austria), ker je podpiral zakon o 
prepovedi muslimanskih tančic s pokrivanjem obrazov in zaostrovanjem imigracijskega 
statusa. Podatki kažejo, da je Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) na teh volitvah zelo dobro odigral svojo 
vloho. Med volitvami leta 2015 je namreč trdil, da je islam del Avstrije in da so priseljenci 
pomemben del avstrijske družbe, ki pomagajo gospodarstvu. Vendar je stranka ÖVP leta 
2015 na volitvah dosegla le majhen odstotek glasov (zgolj 24 %). Tako je imel Kurz med 
volitvami 2017 novo ideologijo, ki je presenetljivo skoraj identična ideologiji stranke FPÖ 
(zmagovalna stranka leta 2015), ki se bori proti »političnemu islamu«. 
 
Glavno vprašanje je, kakšno vlogo so pri vseh teh rezultatih imeli mediji. Ker poznamo cilje 
te kampanje, bomo pokazali, katera orodja so uporabljali in kako pogosto so se pojavljali v 
medijih. Prvič, volilno kampanjo 2017 so zaznamovale različne spremembe. Čeprav je 
televizijsko oglaševanje volilnih kampanj v Avstriji zakonsko prepovedano, pa je SPÖ 
napovedala, da bodo veliko denarja vložili v televizijske oglase (statistika kaže, da je šlo 18 
% sredstev iz sklada kampanje). Poleg tega ta kampanja vlaga v medije in spletna orodja, 
namesto da bi se predstavljala na plakatih. Družbene medije uporabljajo kot uveljavljeno 
sredstvo za kampanjo. Vsak od kandidatov je imel svoj profil na Facebooku, stranke pa so 
uporabljale tudi YouTube kanal z izdajo več kot 500 videov v šestih kampanjskih tednih. 
Javna radiotelevizija Österreichischer Rundfunk (v nadaljevanju besedila: ORF) še naprej 
prevladuje na televizijskem trgu in je imela pomembno vlogo pri promociji ciljev teh strank. 
ORF, ki upravlja štiri televizijske kanale, je v letu 2015 dosegel desetkrat več gledalcev kot 
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najbolj priljubljen zasebni kanal Puls 4, ki je v lasti medijskega podjetja ProSiebenSat.1. ORF 
je podvržen političnemu vplivu, ker stranke prek skrbniškega odbora izdajatelja televizijskih 
programov sodelujejo pri izbiri njegovega predsednika (Press Freedom Index, 2018). 
 
TV-razprave med pari najboljših kandidatov so dobro uveljavljeni dogodki v avstrijskih 
kampanjah ter vzbujajo veliko pozornosti med volivci in novinarji (Plasser, Fritz, & Günther, 
2010, pp. 193-240). Leta 2017 je deset dvojnih razprav, ki jih je organizirala javna 
radiotelevizija, v povprečju pritegnilo več kot 700.000 gledalcev (11 % volivcev). Več kot 1,2 
milijona gledalcev (19 % volivcev) si je ogledalo zadnji krog z vsemi najboljšimi kandidati 
(OFR, 2017). To je bilo najbolj obsežno poročanje doslej, ki ga je ORF ponudil pred volitvami 
v nacionalni svet – z več kot 72 urami intervjujev v živo, analizami, televizijskimi razpravami, 
poročili in prispevki ter približno 500 poročil v skupni dolžini nekaj manj kot enajst ur za 
izbiro programov ZiB v ORF 1 in ORF 2. Zato so imeli vsi državljani možnost, da so o teh 
razpravah obveščeni tako v javnosti (ORF) kot tudi prek dveh glavnih zasebnih kanalov (Puls 
4 in ATV). 
 
Samo »krog najboljših kandidatov« je dosegel do 1.409 milijonov ljudi, ki jih zanima politika 
(v povprečju 1.211 milijonov z 41-odstotnim tržnim deležem, 39 odstotkov v ciljni skupini 
od 12 do 49 let in 36 odstotkov od 12 do 29 let v živo na ORF 2). To je bil najuspešnejši krog 
po letu 2006 in daleč najbolj gledani program v času volitev na avstrijski televiziji (OFR, 
2017). Kar 29 od 30 najširših TV-formatov za volitve v državni svet 2017 je bilo prikazanih 
na ORF. Od 100 televizijskih minut, ki jih je javnost gledala na avstrijskih TV-kanalih v času 
parlamentarnih volitev, jih je bilo 74 mogoče pripisati TV-programom ORF. Več kot dva 
milijona Avstrijcev je volilne dvoboje videlo izključno na ORF (in nihče od komercialnih 
konkurentov). S svojimi volilnimi spopadi je imel ORF tudi največ gledalcev v vseh ciljnih 
skupinah. Javno zanimanje za predtekmovanje volitev 2017 je bilo ogromno: rekordno 
število je doseglo »poletne pogovore« s Tarekom Leitnerjem, ki so bila tudi prva pogajanja 
v tistem volilnem letu na ORF. V povprečju si je pet razprav ogledalo 782.000 gledalcev z 
28-odstotnim tržnim deležem; v ciljni skupini mladih, starih od 12 do 49 let, je bil tržni delež 
21-odstoten (OFR, 2017), kar pomeni, da so bili »poletni pogovori« 2017 najbolj gledani v 
zgodovini serije. »Poletni pogovor« s Sebastianom Kurzom je bil najbolj gledan »poletni 
pogovor« doslej. Volitve 2017 so bile na ORF-ju tudi hit na družbenih medijih: Facebook 
stran ORF je imela več kot 6 milijonov ogledov videov in več kot 1,2 milijona interakcij. 
 
Kaj nam vse to pove? Vsi cilji, ki so jih te stranke imele naperjene proti muslimanom, 
imigraciji, zaščiti meja, prepovedi nošenja burke za muslimanke, zapiranju muslimanskih 
vrtcev, vodenju islamskih centrov, so bili predstavljeni na javni televiziji. Slišani so bili po 
vsej Avstriji, zato se je večina Avstrijcev strinjala z njimi. Po volilnem vodniku je volilna 
udeležba znašala 79 odstotkov, kar pomeni, da je na teh volitvah volilo 5.120.881 Avstrijcev 
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(Election Guide, 2017). Kar 1.595.526 Avstrijcev je glasovalo za Avstrijsko ljudsko stranko 
(ÖVP), 1.361.746 za Avstrijsko socialdemokratsko stranko (SPÖ), 1.316.442 pa za Stranko 
svobode Avstrije (FPÖ). Čeprav njihove ideologije takrat niso bile podprte z močnimi dokazi, 
so stranke med volitvami uporabile medije kot stalni opomin, da bi lahko bilo življenje 
Avstrijcev boljše, če bi bili sprejeti predlogi teh strank, če bi glasovali za boljši jutri, če bi se 
zanašali na te stranke, ki bi nas v prihodnosti rešile pred tako imenovanim političnim 
islamom, muslimani in njihovimi prepričanji. In očitno jim je uspelo. Mediji, zavedno ali 
nezavedno, močno vplivajo na nas. So eden najlažjih načinov manipulacije z ljudmi, pa naj 
si to priznamo ali ne. 
 
Z uporabo podobnega pristopa kot pri analizi parlamentarnih volitev v Avstriji leta 2017 
bomo na primeru volitev prikazali, kako so mediji vplivali na rezultate parlamentarnih 
volitev v Sloveniji leta 2018. Najprej bomo predstavili, kako in v kolikšni meri so se na 
televiziji in radiu pojavljale politične stranke med volitvami 2018 ter kako je to vplivalo na 
odnos do migrantov, torej muslimanov, ki prihajajo v državo. 
V volilni kampanji so nekateri predstavniki zmagovalne stranke SDS uporabili neliberalno 
retoriko o vprašanjih migracij in civilne družbe. SDS je razobesila tudi ogromne plakate, ki 
so opozarjali na migrantsko invazijo in obljubljali, da ne bodo niti enemu migrantu dovolili 
vstopa v državo. Vendar je Janez Janša (SDS) odigral vlogo odprtega in dostopnega politika, 
ki je vsem ponujal roko sodelovanja. Na javnih nastopih je pokazal veliko spretnosti in 
izkušenj, česar novinci in številni tekmovalci njegove druge lige preprosto niso imeli. Po 
strokovnih standardih je bila kampanja SDS precej pred drugimi (Lovec, 2018, p. 5) 
 
Vemo, da so politične stranke odvisne od medijev in da predstavljajo najhitrejšo vez med 
politiko in družbo. Kot smo že omenili, je televizija odigrala ključno vlogo na avstrijskih 
volitvah leta 2017, saj je televizija oblika medija, ki je razumljiv vsem, nepismenim, 
starejšim ljudem in tudi otrokom. Zakon o medijih v tem primeru določa pravila, katerih 
namen je pravična zastopanost političnih stališč v novicah in informativnih oddajah na 
kanalih in storitvah PSM (ang. Public service media), vendar ni imenovanega organa, ki bi 
imel učinkovito izvršilno pooblastilo, ki bi to predstavništvo spregledalo (Milosavljevic, 
Gerjevic, & Petkovic, 2018). 
 
V konkretnem primeru predstavljamo, kako pogosto so se politične stranke med volitvami 
2018 pojavljale na televiziji. 
 
Znano je, da SDS upravlja televizijsko postajo Nova24TV in njihovo vsebino, poleg tega pa 
ima tudi uredniško podporo političnih časopisov Reporter in Demokracija, katerih vsebino 
poznamo kot tudi njihov odnos do islama in migracij. Pred parlamentarnimi volitvami 12. 
marca 2018 je agencija Parsifal, ki izvaja tržne in javnomnenjske raziskave, opravila anketo 
xiii 
 
za Novo24TV, ki kaže, da bi velika večina volivcev, več kot 70 odstotkov, glasovala za SDS, 
stranko, ki, domnevno, ima program s konkretnimi rešitvami. Gre za logično zaključeno 
napihnjeno analizo, saj je v tej analizi več kot 70 odstotkov državljanov glasovalo za stranko 
SDS, vendar resnični parlamentarni rezultati 3. junija 2018 kažejo, da je za to stranko 
glasovalo le 24,92 odstotka državljanov. To je bil poskus psihološke narave, ki je družbi 
vnaprej pokazal rezultate, kako bi glasovala večina. Podoben model so uporabili v Mehiki 
med skorumpirano vlado. Pri tem je pomembno poudariti, da je prav Nova24TV vztrajala 
pri takšni analizi in jo tudi objavila. 
 
V tem primeru televizija in radio igrata glavno vlogo in sta hkrati glavni vir informacij med 
volitvami. Redne volitve so bile poleg televizijskega poročanja predvajane na Radiu 
Slovenija, predvsem na Prvem programu PRVI. Radio Slovenija je predvajal pet soočenj 
strank, ki so trajala uro in pol in so se v sredo ob 17. uri predvajala v živo. Obravnavane so 
bile različne teme, od zunanje politike, migracij do reševanja problemov v slovenskem 
zdravstvu. Razprave strank je bilo možno spremljati tudi v živo prek Facebooka. Prav tako 
je Prvi program PRVI vsak dan ob 11.15 napovedal predstavitev kandidatov in strank, ki 
bodo kandidirale v vseh volilnih enotah. 
 
Sveži rezultati javnomnenjskih raziskav so bili objavljeni vsak petek, ob 16.30 pa je bila na 
Prvem programu PRVI objavljena tudi analiza aktivnosti kandidatov iz prejšnjega tedna. 
Trditve kandidatov na soočenjih in predstavitvah so preverili tudi novinarji programa PRVI 
ter dejstva primerjali s podatki. 
 
Kar zadeva televizijo, RTV Slovenija je prikazovala soočanja kandidatov na volitvah leta 2018 
med predsedniki vseh strank, parlamentarnih in neparlamentarnih. Prva, ustanovna 
razprava je bila v ponedeljek, 7. maja 2018, ob 20. uri, ko se je kampanja tudi uradno začela 
na RTV Slovenija. Do 1. junija so potekala soočanja med predsedniki strank in 
parlamentarnimi strankami, razgovori s predstavniki zunajparlamentarnih strank, razprave 
med neparlamentarnimi strankami kot tudi razgovori s predstavniki parlamentarnih strank. 
 
Poleg televizijskih razprav med strankami so predstavljali tudi politične dejavnosti, 
televizijske reklame o strankah in samozastopanje političnih strank. Zakaj jemljemo 
televizijske razprave kot primer vpliva na islamofobijo, zlasti v času volitev 2018? Med 
televizijskimi razpravami, kjer kandidati razpravljajo med seboj, se morajo v trenutkih hitre 
razprave zavedati, da so odgovorni za svoje odgovore, ki jih je treba premišljeno podati. 
Eden takšnih primerov je vprašanje zunanje politike. Čeprav problem migracij v Sloveniji ni 
tako razširjen kot v Avstriji, so se predstavniki strank borili proti množičnim migracijam in 
širjenju radikalne islamizacije. Zmagovalna stranka SDS je bila med volitvami prva stranka, 
ki je predlagala vzpostavitev nadzora na obmejnih območjih. Poslanci SDS so med 
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televizijskimi razpravami opozarjali, da migracijski tokovi predstavljajo največji varnostni 
izziv tako za Slovenijo kot Evropsko unijo. To je edini razlog, da bi morala Vlada Republike 
Slovenije pripraviti ukrepe in rešitve glede migracijskih tokov, parlament pa jih ima pravico 
in hkrati dolžnost seznaniti z njimi. Opozarjali so tudi na to, da je bila Slovenija na 
migrantsko krizo v drugi polovici leta 2015 in v prvih mesecih leta 2016 povsem 
nepripravljena. Po mnenju poslancev se takšno stanje ne sme ponoviti. 
 
Je vse to vplivalo na to, da so Slovenci sploh šli glasovat? Kako se je to odražalo v njihovem 
odnosu do muslimanov? Čeprav ni podatkov o stopnji gledanosti volitev 2018, je po 
volilnem vodniku volilna udeležba na parlamentarnih volitvah v Sloveniji znašala 52 
odstotkov, natančneje 901.457 glasov (Election Guide, 2018). Torej, če primerjamo to 
število s številom glasov samo za zmagovalno stranko SDS, ki je bilo 222.042 (Election 
Guide, 2018), lahko potrdimo dejstvo, da je SDS skupaj s svojo protimigracijsko kampanjo 
vplivala na Slovence. Večino Slovencev jim je uspelo prepričati, da glasujejo za 
protimigracijsko politiko, s tem pa so prispevali k povečanju stopnje islamofobije v državi. 
 
Cilj diplomske naloge je bil približati ljudem resnično sliko islama. Želeli smo pokazati, da 
ne gre za religijo, ki zagovarja nasilje, prisilo in ubijanje nedolžnih ljudi. Samo 
nerazumevanje religije je privedlo do islamofobije v mnogih evropskih državah, tudi v 
Avstriji in Sloveniji. Naš cilj je bil med drugim tudi pokazati, ali so mediji vplivali na 
povečanje stopnje islamofobije v prej omenjenih državah. Glede na naše podatke lahko 
jasno rečemo, da imajo mediji velik vpliv na družbo, vendar ko gre za določene teme, kot 
je islamofobija, podatki kažejo, da v obeh državah obstajajo mediji z visoko stopnjo 
diskriminacije in sovraštva proti muslimanom. Mediji so bili uporabljeni na način, da so 
ustvarili strah in zavrnitev muslimanov s strani družbe v obeh državah. Da bi pokazali vpliv 
medijev, zlasti na stopnjo islamofobije, smo predstavili vlogo medijev med volitvami. Pri 
tem smo prišli do rezultata, da so mediji eden od ključnih dejavnikov za uspeh političnih 
strank in povečanje islamofobije v državah. Tako so bili avstrijski mediji glavni vir informacij 
in poročanja o političnih kampanjah, ki so zagovarjale boj proti tako imenovanemu 
»političnemu islamu«, hkrati pa so s svojo kampanjo sebe predstavile kot idealnega 
zaščitnika državljanov v boju proti islamu. Podatki o porabi medijev kažejo, da je medijem 
uspelo doseči svoj končni cilj; to je, da so vplivali na družbo, ki bo glasovala za stranke, ki 
podpirajo protiislamska dejanja. V primeru Slovenije imamo enak scenarij, kjer ima 
desničarska politična stranka v lasti določene medije in jih uporablja zlasti v času volitev za 
spodbujanje njihove politike proti migracijam. Čeprav v tem primeru nimamo podatkov o 
porabi medijev, je slednjim vseeno uspelo vplivati na družbo in podpreti stranko, ki 
zagovarja protimigracijsko politiko. 
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Na podlagi vseh raziskav o vplivu medijev na islamofobijo v Avstriji in Sloveniji lahko 
potrdimo prvo hipotezo. 
 
Potrjujemo hipotezo, ki temelji na statističnih podatkih o porabi medijev med volitvami. Iz 
podatkov je razvidno, da je medijem med volitvami uspelo pritegniti javni interes, zlasti s 
prikazovanjem novic z islamofobno vsebino, da bi dosegli zmago svoje stranke. Boj proti 
islamu in migracijam je bil med volitvami glavna politika obeh držav, kar je dodatno 
povzročilo povečanje stopnje islamofobije. 
 
Drugo hipotezo ovržemo, ker se pojavljanje islamofobije ni pojavilo pri prvih generacijah 
priseljenih muslimanov, ampak z nakopičenimi vrstami sovražnih zločinov, diskriminacije in 
mrženj do muslimanom v preteklih letih. Glavni razlog nesprejmanja islama je njegovo 
nerazumevanje, kar ne nazadnje povzroča pojav islamofobije. 
 
Kot priporočilo za prihodnje delo bi navedli zavedanje o pomenu mladih visoko izobraženih 
ljudi. Kako pritegniti mlade, da se vključijo v politiko in javni sektor ter s tem »osvežijo« 
politični svet Evrope. Mladi imajo objektivna mnenja, njihova zastopanost pa presega meje 
države. Na Evropo gledajo kot celoto, kar vodi k lažjemu in bolj odprtemu delu pri 
spremljanju zakonodaje EU. Drugo priporočilo pa bi bila pravna ureditev predvolilnih objav. 
Menimo, da je oglaševanje s posredovanjem nezanesljivih informacij in/ali zavajajoče, 
neprepoznano ali prikrito oglaševanje lahko zelo nevarno, zlasti v času volitev. Ko rečemo, 
da je prej omenjeno oglaševanje lahko zelo nevarno, mislimo s tem na napačne informacije, 
ki krožijo v medijih med volilno kampanjo, zaradi katerih ljudje niso sposobni prepoznati, 
ali so resnične ali ne. Ne nazadnje to vodi v spremembo mnenja o posameznih političnih 
kampanjah in na koncu celo do zmage nekaterih političnih strank. Zakon o pravni ureditvi 
predvolilnih objav bi urejal preglednost in točnost takšnih objav. 
 
Upamo, da nam je s to diplomsko nalogo uspelo razjasniti napačne predstavitve o islamu 
in zmanjšati stopnjo islamofobije v prihodnosti. 
  
xvi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
IZJAVA O AVTORSTVU DIPLOMSKEGA DELA ...................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................ v 
POVZETEK .......................................................................................................................................... vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ xvi 
LIST OF IMAGES ............................................................................................................................... xvii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................ xvii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. xviii 
1 INDTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
2 ISLAM AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM .................................................... 4 
2.1.1. Holy Quran ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.2 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN AUSTRIA ........................................................................... 7 
2.3 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN SLOVENIA ......................................................................... 9 
3 ISLAMOPHOBIA ........................................................................................................ 11 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA ................................................... 12 
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA................................................. 14 
4 MEDIA ....................................................................................................................... 16 
4.1 ROLE AND IMPACT OF MEDIA ON SOCIETY .............................................................. 17 
4.1.1. The role of the media in Austria ............................................................................... 18 
4.1.2. The role of the media in Slovenia ............................................................................. 20 
5 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA ............................................... 24 
5.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF AUSTRIA ............................................................................... 24 
5.1.1. The Parliament ......................................................................................................... 25 
5.2 RESULTS OF AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2017 ...................................... 25 
5.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2017 ............................. 26 
6 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA ............................................. 30 
6.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SLOVENIA ............................................................................. 30 
6.1.1. The Parliament ......................................................................................................... 30 
6.2 RESULTS OF SLOVENIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2018 .................................... 31 
6.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2018 ............................. 32 
7 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA 36 
8 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 38 
9 LITERATURE AND SOURCES ...................................................................................... 40 
  
xvii 
 
LIST OF IMAGES 
Picture 1: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Kronen Zeitung .......................................... 20 
Picture 2: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Wochenblick .............................................. 20 
Picture 3: An example of Islamophobia on the front page of Slovenian Democracy newspaper ... 22 
Picture 4: The example of dehumanization of Muslims on Social Networks ................................... 23 
Picture 5: FPÖosters as a fight against Islam ................................................................................... 27 
Picture 6: Slovenian Democratic Party on Migration ....................................................................... 32 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Results of Austrian Parliamentary Election 2017 ............................................................... 26 
Table 2: The" summer talk" in chronological order ......................................................................... 28 
Table 3: TV confrontations in chronological order .......................................................................... 29 
Table 4: Results of Slovenian Parliamentary Election 2018 ............................................................. 31 
Table 5: RADIO confrontations in chronological order .................................................................... 34 
Table 6: TV confrontations in chronological order .......................................................................... 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xviii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
SPÖ   The Social Democratic Party of Austria 
ÖVP   The Austrian People’s Party 
FPÖ   The Freedom Party of Austria 
SDS   The Slovenian Democratic Party 
LMS   The List of Marjan Sarec 
SD   The Social Democrats 
IGGiÖ   Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich/ The Islamic Religious 
Community in Austria 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
ÖIF   The Austrian Integration Fund 
ORF  Österreichischer Rundfunk 
CE  Common Era 
PSM  Public service media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 INDTRODUCTION 
In the diploma thesis, we discuss the occurrence of Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia 
and the main impacts that caused this phenomenon. Namely, Islam has been a part of 
Austria for a long time and there were no major conflicts with the authorities, until the 
2017 parliamentary elections, when some political parties decided that one of the goals 
would be fighting against so-called "political Islam". The fight against “political Islam” has 
given the right to individual political parties to interfere in the pillars of Islam and thereby 
used media to present this way as the right way. We will investigate in this case the impact 
of media on results of the Parliamentary election 2017. 
 
As far as Slovenia is concerned, Muslims in Slovenia is at the very beginning of integrating 
Islam in the country, in regard to Austria. Namely, in 1960 Muslims first applied for a permit 
to build a mosque, but it was not built until 2015 where they obtained a permit to build a 
mosque in Ljubljana. It is the first Islamic center but the second mosque, because in 1914 
the first mosque was built in Slovenia and was built by Bosniak soldiers in World War I, who 
fought on the side of Austro-Hungary. In addition to the construction of the second 
mosque, huge attention in politics and the media, especially the right-wing parties and 
Nova24TV (Slovenian right-wing news media) has attracted the name of the street 
"Mosque Street", in which the mosque is currently built. As we know, the right-wing party 
in Europe is usually in favour of strict refugee policy and their rejection on European soil, 
and so is the right-wing one in Slovenia. The SDS (Slovenian Democratic Party), during the 
parliamentary elections of 2018, presented the emergence of migrants as a danger to 
Slovenian citizens and thus collected political support for right-wingers. However, the link 
between Migration and Islam is much more established in right-wing media in an 
Islamophobic way. 
 
The reason why we want to discuss and present the issues of this topic is, that as students 
of the Faculty of Administration, majoring in public sector governance, we have acquired 
the ability to think critically and analytically, and as a result, we are aware of urgent 
multidisciplinary changes when it comes to Islamophobia, as one of the problems in society. 
Students of the Administration, as future young leaders, take on the responsibilities of 
making important decisions on the social, political, and legal aspects, and represent an 
indispensable share in politics and public administration, which represent stakeholders in 
the regulation of the media space and electoral system. 
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The purpose of the diploma thesis is to investigate the role of the media and its way of 
portraying Islam in these two countries, mainly because of the benefit of countries, as well 
as peace and unity in it. 
 
In order to gather more votes for right-wing political parties, the media, in collaboration 
with right-wing political parties, are trying to portray the fear of Muslims, portraying their 
party as a protector against the wave of Muslims coming to the country in the future. 
Technically, by voting for right-wingers, people create prejudices about Islam and Muslims 
because they have fears that political parties convey through the media. And in the thesis, 
our aim is to display the evidence of these claims. 
 
During the research, we pursue the following goals in particular: 
- at the conceptual-theoretical level, we highlight different conceptions of 
Islamophobia, where we present different opinions of the author on the concept 
of Islamophobia, 
- we present a historical background of Islam and we express our personal 
opinion on Islam as a religion, 
- we show how the Muslim religion was initially integrated into the culture of 
Austria and Slovenia and thus obtained its rights by law, 
- we present the notion of media and their impact on society, 
- we research the impact of media on the rise of the Islamophobia,  
- we present results of the Parliamentary election in Austria and Slovenia, 
- Using the concept of media, we examine the impact of the media on results in 
both countries, 
 
In the continuation of diploma work, we used different research approaches: 
- using the descriptive method, we describe the main concepts found in the work 
and related to the subject, 
- at the theoretical level, we introduce Islamophobia where we describe the 
different approaches of several authors, 
- using the historical method, we determine how media influenced on 
Islamophobia and how it is understood throughout history, 
- using the synthesis method, we get answers in the theoretical part to the 
question of why Islamophobia is on the rise and how its rise has been influenced 
by the Austrians and Slovenian political parties, 
- with the analysis of secondary data, we present results of the Parliamentary 
election in Austria and Slovenia, 
- using a comparative method, we compare differences and similarities between 
Austria and Slovenia 
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In the work we set out the following hypothesis: 
- The impact of the media on the rise of Islamophobia in Austria and Slovenia was 
significantly expressed during the elections. 
- Muslims themselves are responsible for the emergence of Islamophobia in 
Austria and Slovenia due to excessive immigration to states. 
The hypotheses will be presented in the last part, where we will first present the various 
evidence that is necessary for the hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed. 
 
In the second chapter of the thesis, using the historical method, we will present significant 
facts about Islam, its historical background, and the main source, the Holy Quran. In the 
same chapter, we will present the integration of Islam into the Austrian and Slovenian 
society. Turning to the third chapter, using the method of description, we will describe the 
definition of theoretical concepts, and present the cause and occurrence of Islamophobia 
in both countries. In the fourth chapter, using the theoretical method, we will define the 
concept of media, its role and impact on society in general, and on our samples, the society 
of Austria and Slovenia. Chapters five and six have the same concept of work, where we 
will use secondary data analysis to present the results of the parliamentary elections in 
both countries, and how the media, together with politicians, have had an impact on these 
results. In the seventh chapter, we will show what are the similarities and differences 
between Austria and Slovenia, reflecting on the presented data. In the last chapter, we will 
briefly present what was the goal of the diploma and the result with which we will confirm 
or disconfirm the hypotheses. 
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2 ISLAM AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISLAM 
In order to better understanding of term Islamophobia, it is necessary to understand the 
religion of Islam, with aim of distinguishing affiliation of these two terms. In this chapter 
we are focusing to historical background and origins of Islam.  
Islam is a monotheistic faith centered around belief in the one God (Allah). In this regard, 
it shares some beliefs with Judaism and Christianity by tracing its history back to the 
patriarch Abraham, and ultimately to the first prophet, Adam. All the prophets preached 
the same universal message of belief in one God and kindness to humanity (United religions 
initiative (URI), 2019). 
 
Besides this, Islam presents a religion and civilization made its entry onto the world stage 
with the life and career of the Prophet Muhammed ibn Abd Allah s.a.v.s.1 (further the 
Prophet Muhammed) ca. 570-632 in western Arabia. (Muslims believe that the Prophet 
Muhammed is the last prophet and after him will not be any other prophet). After his 
death, a serious of successor called caliphs2 claimed political authority over the Muslims 
community. During the period of caliphate, Islam grew into religious tradition and 
civilization of worldwide importance. A properly historical view of Islam’s appearance and 
early development, however, demands that these processes be situated against the 
cultural background of sixty-century Arabia, and more generally, the Near East (Esposito, 
1999, S. 1). 
 
The Prophet Muhammed plays an essential role in spreading religion and verses from the 
Holy Quran. Before him, there were numerous other prophets who also called for Islam, 
but according to Islamic beliefs, Muhammad is the last prophet and there will be no more 
prophets after him.  
 
The Prophet Muhammad was born in 570 CE (Common Era) in the city of Mecca in the 
Arabian Peninsula, part of modern-day Saudi Arabia. As his father had died shortly after 
marriage, his grandfather became his guardian. He used frequent a cave that became 
known as “Hira ‘” on the Mountain of “Nur” for contemplation. It was in that cave in 610 
CE, i.e. at the age of forty, that Prophet Muhammad received from Allah the first verses of 
the Quran. Then and there, history changed (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 5-7). 
 
                                                          
1 Salallahu alejhi we sellem or abbreviated form s.a.v.s. of Arabic origin means, "May Allah's mercy and 
peace be upon Him," and it is mandatory to use this abbreviation after mentioning every Prophet in Islam. 
2 Caliph- Arabic khalīfah (“successor”), in Islamic history the ruler of the Muslim community. (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2019) 
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In this cave the Archangel Gabriel appeared to him and reveal to them first verses of Quran. 
First verses of Quran were: “Ikre Bismi Rabbike” (Quran, 610, S. 96:2-6), which means to 
read in the name of your Lord (Allah). After the first verse, the Prophet had the duty to 
transmit and teach other people by inviting them to Islam. 
 
The Quran continued to be revealed in fragments to the Prophet Muhammad over the 
following twenty-two years. The last words of the Holy Book were revealed to the Prophet 
shortly before his death in 632 CE (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 9-10). During their mission, prophet 
faces with many battles, harassments and abuse as so their followers. Prophet instructed 
Muslims to escape from tortures and executions caused by enemies of Islam. Biggest 
immigration was named Hijra. 
 
The concept of Hijrah, which presents the Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to 
Medina in 622 CE, have a huge impact in Islam. Because of persecutions among Muslims 
and difficult to practice their religion in Mecca, the Prophet migrated to Medina. Hence, in 
the mainstream Islamic discourse, Hijrah constitutes moving from Dar al-Harb to Dar al-
Islam. “Dar al-Harb, which literally means―” house of war”, refers to lands where Islamic 
law is not implemented or where Muslims do not enjoy the freedom to practice their 
religion. Conversely, Dar al-Islam, which literally means ―” house of Islam”, refers to areas 
under the rule of Islam” (Ebstein, 2006, pp. 53-85). The traditional meaning of Hijrah, 
therefore, is that only Muslims who are unable to practice Islam, or face opposition when 
they do so, are obligated to migrate to the lands of the Muslims (Ebstein, 2006, S. 53-85). 
 
The Prophet lived in Medina for about ten years. By the time of his departure from this 
world in 632 CE, Islam had become well established as the religion of the Arabian Peninsula 
and had made inroads in neighbouring regions; Muslims had become a major force to be 
reckoned with in the area (Fatoohi, 2009, S. 20-23). After a ninth years, year before Prophet 
death, he went to pilgrimage3 to Mecca, and he received following verse of the Quran:  
 
“This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favor upon you and have 
chosen for you Islam as religion” (Quran, 610, S. 5:4) 
 
This verse said in effect that the message which the Prophet had brought from God and 
which by word and deed he had been expounding all these years, had been completed. 
Every part of this Message was a blessing. The Message now completed embodied the 
highest blessings which man could receive from God (Aḥmad, 2013, S. 182). 
 
                                                          
3 Pilgrimage (arab. Hajj)- one of the main Muslim duty that represent traveling to Mecca and visiting Kaaba. 
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After the last pilgrim, the Prophet Muhammed knows that the end of his life is near. His life 
was dedicated to spreading the faith and calling people to Islam. All that he left behind is 
true Islam, an Islam that many people misunderstand today. The Islam that Muhammed 
represents to the world was Islam full of salvation, humanity, peace, and purity. The very 
concept of Islam is impossible not to associate with Muhammad. The Prophet was a man 
who did not stand out in any way physically from other people, he did not wear lavish 
clothes, he was always calm and clean, very fond of body cleanliness, as well as everything 
around him. He never raised his voice but spoke a lot through his behaviour. He led a very 
simple life, never complaining, even at the end of his life when he was in huge pains. He 
was never abusive to bullies, even when they were abusive to him. If we had to explain the 
religion of Islam, the simplest way would be to talk about the life of the Prophet and his 
actions. And this is the real picture of Islam, not a long beard, not niqab or hijab, but your 
behavior, your manners, how you treat people, that is what makes you a real Muslim, 
everything after that counts. 
2.1.1. Holy Quran 
In order to clarify the beliefs of Muslims, we present the Quran as the main source of all 
rules and directions, according to Muslims must live. The authenticity of the Quran has 
often been questioned, which is why in this chapter we will offer some of our found 
evidence of the authenticity of this Holy Book. 
 
During the revelation of this Holy Book, the Prophet Muhammed was facing with a frequent 
accusation that verses of Quran are a lie, and non-believers have often requested a sing as 
a proof of the truth. In the following verse, the Prophet was ordered to show the Quran in 
response to their requests, and the following verse was published: “And is it not sufficient 
for them that We revealed to you the Book which is recited to them? Indeed, in that is a 
mercy and reminder for a people who believe” (Quran, S. 29:51). 
 
As evidence to the people who do not believe the Quran is God's words, and to the people 
who claimed that Muhammad invented these verses, we can corroborate with the first part 
of this verse which says: “…We revealed to you (Muhammed) the Book..” (Quran, S. 29:51), 
so God revealed to Muhammad, to a person who did not know how to read or write nor 
did not attend school and had no education. How can an uneducated man say these verses? 
 
As the next proof of the authenticity of this book, we present the following verses from the 
Quran: “And you did not recite before it any scripture, nor did you inscribe one with your 
right hand. Otherwise, the falsifiers would have had [cause for] doubt” (Quran, S. 29:48). 
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From this verse, we can see that Muhammad really was uneducated, because as we 
understand from the verse, he had not read anything else before nor he had not written 
anything by his own hand, so he was illiterate. Our opinion can be supported with the words 
of one of the greatest thinkers of the last century, Jules Masserman, who stated in his 
lectures in 1840 that, if Muhammad was educated man, then there would be room for 
doubt that the Quran was not the Word of God. If he had been an educated, then his 
enemies' doubts would have been that he had transcribed the Quran from the books of the 
Jews and the Christians (Deedat, S. 13-14), but Muhammad was uneducated and it was 
impossible to do. 
 
In the Quran are consisted of all instructions and rules on how to live this life and prepare 
for another. Frist revelation from God to Muhammed were to read, to learn, to examine 
things in the name of God. Examining the first verses of this magnificent book, we can see 
that God did not specify just Muslim people, but He instead addressed to all humanity, to 
learn and educate yourself. Importance of this verse we can use today and look at the 
notion of education, how important it is today for a person to be educated, and to learn 
from day to day a new thing. And this is only one of the proofs of the impassability of this 
book. For example, in the Qur'an, there are answers for the smallest things, from 
relationships to God, your spouse, the justice system, to treatment towards your 
neighbors. For every situation in life, you can find a solution in this book. 
2.2 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN AUSTRIA 
Freedom of religion is a statutorily guaranteed right in Austria, the legal foundation – 
starting with the Patents of Tolerance (ger. Toleranzpatent) on 1781/82 (Austria Patent No. 
1781/82, 1781) – have been created over a period of about two centuries. Of great 
importance for the individual is the constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience and 
creed (right to choose of religion) laid down in Article 14 of the Basic Law on the General 
Rights of Nationals of 1867. This Article, in combination with the Law Regarding Inter-
Confessional Relation-ships of 1868, guarantees every resident in Austria the right to join 
any church or the religious community by free choice, to leave such church or religious 
community at his/her own personal discretion or, finally, to abstain from belonging to any 
of them (The Austrian Federal Chancellery, 2011), so according to law, every Austrians, over 
the age of fourteen, are allowed to choose their religion, as well as change their beliefs. 
 
Free exercise of religion and freedom of religion and conscience are guaranteed for 
everyone in Austria, regardless of whether a church or religious community is legally 
recognized or not or registered as a confessional community. All churches and religious 
communities in Austria enjoy special protection under the law: offenses such as the 
denigration of religious doctrines and the disturbance of a religious event are prosecuted 
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under criminal law; facilities and property dedicated to religious services enjoy enhanced 
protection under criminal law in cases of theft or wilful damage (Austrian Embassy, 2011). 
 
When it comes to Islam, Austria legally recognized Islam as a state religion in 1912 and in 
1979 it acknowledged the Islamic Religious Community in Austria (ger. Islamische 
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ) as the official representative for all Muslims in 
this country, by making that religious community equal as well as other legally recognized 
religious communities (i.e. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) (Sezgin, 2019, pp. 869-886). 
 
In Austria, in the 1971 census survey, Islam as a religious denomination, was first included 
as a category which registered 0.3% of the population as Muslim. By the 1991 census, this 
number had increased to 2%, and in the 2001 census to 4.2%, when about 350,000 
individuals designated Islam as their religious affiliation.  According to the Austrian 
Integration Fund (ÖIF), there were about half a million Muslims in 2009 in Austria, 
constituting approximately 6% of the country’s population, whereas this number had 
increased to 700,000 Muslims in 2017, representing about 8% of the population (Janda & 
Vogl, 2010). 
 
As we mentioned, Islam is legally recognized in Austria with Islam Law of 1912 (ger. Islam-
Gesetz 1912) placing Muslims equal (lat. de jure) to the followers of other officially 
recognized religious communities and formed the legal basis for recognition of the Islamic 
community as a corporation of public law (Koglmann, 1999, pp. 315-336), so that means 
that Muslims have obtained the right to publicly practice their beliefs (like building 
mosque), which was a huge step for the Muslim community in Austria back then.  
 
During World War I and the end of the Habsburg Monarchy, efforts to institutionalize Islam 
were halted. with the founding and development of the Islamic Cultural League, an Islamic 
non-governmental organization (NGO) in 1932, Islam flourished again. However, after 
Austria was annexed by Nazi Germany, this organization was suspended (Heine, Lohlke, & 
Potz, 2012). During the short period from 1943 to 1948, was founded another Islamic NGO, 
the Islamic Community of Vienna, and the end of the Second World War, the Association 
of Muslims in Austria came into being. However, the organizations did not play an active 
role in the institutionalization of Islam but mainly dealt with religious and charitable issues. 
(Bihl, 1991). 
 
After a long period, in 2015, the Austrian Parliament announces an amendment to Islamic 
law (an amendment to Islamic law that was already passed in the time of the Habsburg-
monarchy), stating that the purpose of the amendment is to protect the freedom of 
Muslims to practice their religion freely in Austria. As the main reason they named that 
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after more than 100 years have passed now, the creation of modern law is called for. It is 
to use termini adapted to today’s teachings and jurisprudence, including the modern 
understanding of legal provisions concerning religious matters and at the same time 
concern itself with the specifics of the Religious Societies (The Federal Ministry Republic of 
Austria, 2015). The main drivers for amending this law, among others, were strong 
immigration of Muslims, which led to the fact that Muslims in Austria today make up 8% of 
the total population, making them the second-largest religious group in the country (Janda 
& Vogl, 2010). 
2.3 ISLAMIC INTEGRATION IN SLOVENIA 
When we talk about the first occurrences of Islam in Slovenia, we must mention the first 
generations of Muslims and therefore Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina who 
emigrated from Bosnia and moved to Slovenia with the aim of a better standard of living. 
The majority of the Muslim living population in Slovenia, are from Bosnia and therefore 
exist two main reasons. 
 
Most Muslims began settling in Slovenia predominantly in the 1970s as labour migrants 
from other republics of Yugoslavia.  Another significant influx of Muslims was in the 1990s, 
when refugee fled war-torn Yugoslavia (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 310). The wars in 
collapsing Yugoslavia of the 1990s resulted in a number of refugees settling in Slovenia, a 
significant portion of them being Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, some from Kosovo. 
The second factor was the fall of socialisms and the consequent chance in state-church 
relations, which contributed to people expressing their religious feelings more openly (Bajt, 
2009, p. 307). Namely, coming to the territories of Slovenia, Bosnian Muslims were formed 
so-called “organization” during Ramadan in 1962 (Pasic, 2002, p. 102), where a few 
Muslims gathered to pray in this holy month. After a certain time, this group of several 
people grew to 100,200, 300 people and so expanded day by day. The idea that Muslims 
needed a place to perform their religious duties had already crystallized at that time and in 
the same year the reis ul-ulema4 Naim Hadziabdic of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina sent a request to the Ljubljana municipal authorities to determine a location 
for the establishment of a mosque5. At that time, according to data from the archives of 
the Islamic Community in Slovenia, around 3,000 Muslims were lived in Slovenia (Pasic, 
2002, p. 105). Up to the 1990s, Islamic communities were registered in only Ljubljana in 
Jesenice, where the two first masjid was established. During the war in Bosnia and 
                                                          
4 The title of religious leader of the Islamic community. 
5 The object where the prayer is performed or a so-called mosque. 
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Herzegovina, the first imams6 came to Slovenia with the refugees. Religious activities 
became more organized and attendance increased steadily (Kalcic, 2007, pp. 7-29). 
 
The Islamic Community in Slovenia (slo. Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji) is one of 
40 religious’ communities in Slovenia registered at the Office for Religious Communities. 
Although it is beginning data back in the 1960s, it was only officially entered into the 
register in 1976 (Pasic, 2002, p. 108). After the fall of Yugoslavia (1991/92) the Islamic 
Community of Yugoslavia also disintegrated the “political seams”. Up to then, the Slovenian 
community was a party of the largest unit with the most members within the Islamic 
Community of the SFRY7, which was called the Eldership of Islamic Community for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. On 18 December 1994, the Islamic Community in 
Slovenia “declared independence” and became an external unit of the newly formed 
Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which established its own Meshihat8 in 
Ljubljana (Valenta, 2011, pp. 163-175). 
 
Unlike Austria, Slovenia has not yet recognized Islam as a religion and as a result, there are 
very few reliable sources on the number of Muslims in the country. According to 2011 data, 
from the book Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: Widening the European discourse on 
Islam by Polish economist Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska, we found the statistics that the 
number of Muslims increased sharply through the period. Namely, the share of Muslims in 
Slovenia rose significantly between the two latest population registration; while their 
recorder number in 1991 was 29,361 and their share 1.5%, according to the latest 2002, 
census 47,488 people or 2,4% of the respondents who choose a religious affiliation are of 
the Islamic faith. This makes Islam a second-largest religion in a two-million country, where 
58% or just over a million inhabitants are Catholic adherence (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 
307). 
 
Although there are no surveys on the diversity of Slovenia’s Muslim population, there are 
evident linguistic and ethnic differences among them, since they are not only Bosniaks but 
also, Albanians, Roma, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Slovenians, etc. Also, several Muslims 
from African and Middle Eastern countries, most of whom came to study in times of 
Yugoslavia, settled in Slovenia, and in recent years asylum seekers from states with 
predominantly Muslim populations (e.g. Iraq, Iran, Turkey, some former Soviet republics), 
yet these represent a small minority (Bajt, 2009, p. 224).  
                                                          
6 The person who leads prayers in a mosque. 
7 SFRY- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
8 The highest religious and administrative body of Muslim community.  
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3 ISLAMOPHOBIA 
When we read a term that ends with a phobia, initially a kind of threat or fear of something 
is formed in our head. It is naturally that we have this feeling that phobia means “that 
something is not right”, but if you added another world such as Islam, people have already 
prejudiced that Islam is also something that is not right. So, when we imagine hearing or 
reading daily about this term Islamophobia, people will eventually get used to, and over 
the time, they will adopt their own definition of Islamophobia, that’s way, we would like to 
explain on the right way, how the term Islamophobia even emerge and what means in that 
time. When we look at the first decade of Islamophobia, we will come across on the 
landmark publication of the highly influential report entitled, Islamophobia: a challenge for 
us all: report of the Runnymede Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 
(The Runnymede Trust Commission, 1997). Of course, this is not when the phenomenon of 
Islamophobia began: it was merely the year in which the first major report was published. 
Since then, Islamophobia has gained a far greater prevalence across both the public and 
political spaces. In the most vocal instances, claim and counter claim to Islamophobia 
typically emerges from bi-polar extremes, from those who decry and denounce any 
criticism whatsoever of Muslims or Islam as being ‘Islamophobic’ to those who actively and 
openly espouse a vitriolic hatred: both sides basing their views on a multitude of different 
causes and justifications. Between these poles a much broader and diverse range of far less 
obvious and explicit issues and incidents exist (Chris, 2016, p. 3). 
 
There is still debating about origin of the term Islamophobia, even though many believe 
that British people had used first this term, but on the other side Oxford English Dictionary 
assuming that American press Insight in 1991, first used this term (Chris, 2016, p. 5), 
however other sources indicate that has actually happened in France. Whatsoever, the real 
question is how Islamophobia is defined. In the article about causes and prevention of 
Islamophobia, Mehtic and Pehlic stipulating their own definition and therefore that 
Islamophobia is an expression of intolerance, hatred, and hostility to Islam and Muslims 
and exercise discrimination against persons, individually or collectively, because they are 
Muslims, or are perceived as such, regardless of their form and with what intensity hatred, 
intolerance, and discrimination expressed and performed (Mehtić & Pehlić, 2013, p. 9). This 
definition precisely indicates discrimination against Muslims and Islam.  
 
On the other side, defining Islamophobia become something a legitimate and tangible 
entity or as a series of different or overlapping conceptual or otherwise phenomena (Chris, 
2016, p. 20), or easier say it, it something that is obvious and do not need to drag some 
much attention on it. For example, Marcel Maussen during Anti-Muslim Sentiments and 
Mobilization event about discourse, policies and violence in Paris said: 
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“‘Islamophobia’ groups together all kinds of different forms of discourse, 
speech and acts, by suggesting that they all emanate from an identical 
ideological core, which is a ‘fear’ or a ‘phobia’ of Islam. However, we should 
distinguish between different kinds of discourse, for instance between 
academic discussions on the relations between Islam and modernity, public 
discussions on whether Islam recognizes the principle of separation of state and 
church, public outcries about Islam as ‘a backward religion’ or as a ‘violent 
religion’, and the forms of hate speech one can find on internet forums and in 
newspapers, such the speech of the late Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who 
systematically called Muslims ‘goatfuckers’. It may well be that these different 
kinds of discourse and speech are related and feed into one another, but we 
cannot simply equate them all and treat them as comparable illustrations of a 
core ideology named ‘Islamophobia’ ” (Maussen, Anti-Muslim Sentiments and 
Mobilization in the Netherlands., 2006). 
 
We will have still a problem in the future to declare what is Islamophobia and what is not. 
As long as the previous author claim that Islamophobia is something that is multifarious 
and wide-ranging, we will always have a problem. He points out that Islam, their backward 
beliefs, and violent acts are to blame for the notion of Islamophobia. Using other words, 
Islam should adopt to every request that the country or community requires in order to be 
accepted, but that not goes like that. Islam stays by its own pillars and they cannot be 
changed or adjusted. 
3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA 
The recognition of Islam by Austria is a result of a specific historical development. It was 
not Islam that came to Austria, but it was Austria that came to Islam, or more precisely to 
Bosnia. Austria occupied Bosnia in 1878. Consequently, the occupying forces created all 
those structures surrounding Islam, which still today represent characteristics of Bosnian 
Islam, like that of the reis ul-ulema, for example (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 116). In Austria, the 
unique status of Islam is not the result of the immigration of Muslim workers in the 1960s 
and 1970s but is, in fact, the result of a historic relationship between Austria and the Balkan 
states, in particular with Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kroissenbrunner, 2003, pp. 375-394). The 
end of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1918 did not bring any changes to this specific 
judicial situation, except for the loss of the subjects of the Islamic Religious Community 
through the detachment of Bosnia. From then on, this law was more or less dormant until 
May 2, 1979, when the creation of an Islamic Religious Community in Austria (ger. 
Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ) was permitted. The demand of the 
first president Ahmad Abdelrahimsai of the IGGiÖ of representing all “members of Islam 
[...] who are residing in Austria” (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 117) was accepted by the head of 
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law and by the public. Since then the Islamic Religious Community in Austria demands full 
rights to speak for all Muslims in Austria, regardless of if they pay their membership fees 
or not (Schmidinger, 2012, p. 117). 
 
So, Austria allows Islam to be part of their society, expressing the whole situation as 
something noble, but the real picture is actually the whole opposite. Austrian politicians 
claim that their “solution” of recognition of Islam, presents as a role model for other 
European countries which one did not yet recognize Islam, but in reality, that was a great 
plan to manipulate with all Muslims in one Community. “Austria is a centrally organized 
corporatist state. In fact, it is often thought of as having the ‘strongest’ corporatist 
institutions in Europe “(Wiarda, 1997, p. 73), in order to satisfy collective interests within 
society, the Austrian state can license (if not create) corporate entities defined by 
occupational, functional, ethnic or religious identity; can structure these entities and 
incorporate them into the state system and, can grant these entities representational 
monopoly and other rights and responsibilities (Sezgin, 2019, pp. 868-886), so we can 
conclude that Austria has more advantages of this recognition than Islam itself. Even 
though Islam is recognized as an official religion and Muslim community is established, 
unfortunately, this cannot guarantee the social acceptances of Muslims in Austria. 
 
In Austria in 2015, according to the first anti-Muslim racism report, there were 156 assaults 
against Muslims (Dokumentationsstelle für Muslime in 2015, 2016), only in 95% of 
incidents women were the main target, while as many as 40% had verbal attacks,12% were 
physical attacks, and 5% involved discrimination. Women who were dressed in Muslim 
traditional clothing with a hijab on their head, with the aim of looking for a job, were the 
particular targets of public insults and discrimination. In addition, Austrian security 
authorities recorded 1156 criminal acts committed by right-wing extremist, 
xenophobic/racist, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic groups in 2015, as compared with 750 in 
2014, an increase of 54.1% (BVT (Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz und 
Terrorismusbekämpfung), 2016). 
 
Intentionally media are a huge part of this parade. Every day we can see that the media is 
trying to portray every step of Muslims as the wrong one. It is not that hard, because they 
have a strong support of Austrian politicians. Especially, of the far-right Freedom Party 
(FPÖ). Observing the history of this campaign, we collected data, that indicates on fact, 
when FPÖ started a campaign against migrants (ger. Ausländerwahlkampf), and portraying 
Islam and Muslims in terrible way, the campaign was one the rise. They succeed to spread 
fear and trembling against Muslims among the Austrians. Since then, FPÖ as a clever 
campaign uses Islamophobia as a mayor strategy in an attempt to win the next elections. 
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Moreover, we already mentioned the announcement of the Islamic Law in 2015, where the 
Austrian government-regulated again the rights of Muslims. What was the real purpose of 
this new law? Even though a huge number of Muslims immigrated to Austria, yet the 
number of Muslims is not bigger than 8% of the total Austrians population (Janda & Vogl, 
2010), so that cannot be a reason for announcing new law. Next, no other religion is 
regulated with such a law, which makes Islam incompatible with other religions in Austria. 
Moreover, announce the ban of receiving founding outside of Austria, aiming precisely at 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but quite opposite, other religions are more than welcome to 
receive founding form Moscow, United State and etc. In their defence, they believe if they 
freeze foreign funding, they will encourage Islam to grow independently in Austria. But 
since then, things get even worse. Government announcing an even stronger fight against 
migration and asylum seekers. Afterward, the ban on the hijab and the burqa in middle 
school and for the women who work in the public sector. But none of this would happen 
without media pressure on Muslims and Islam, with the huge support of the Austrian 
government. 
3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA 
As early as 1969, the Muslims living in Slovenia made a request for a / mosque to be built 
in Ljubljana and they have been waited for permission for a long time. What fears of Islam 
torment Slovenian public to induce them to infringe on a basic constitutional right of their 
fellow citizens of Muslim faith? How well do Slovenians really know Islam, so that they feel 
comfortable making judgments and taking up positions that bear a consequence on the 
interrelationship between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations, to the point of 
fomenting intolerance? And what are the members of the Islamic Religious Community in 
Slovenia able and willing to do to establish a better dialogue with the wider public (Zalta, 
2009, p. 115)? 
 
More or less, Slovenian have the same attitudes toward Muslims like the rest of Europe. 
The period between 2000 and 2001 saw the emergence of the so-called ‘immigrant crisis’, 
when ‘an explicitly stigmatizing and discriminatory media discourse on illegal immigrants 
gained ground in Slovenia’ (Jalušič, 2001, p. 13). At the beginning of the migration, migrants 
have often called “others” or “illegal” and were generally unaccepted of the Slovenian 
society. Negative and intolerance reactions of Slovenian society toward migrants have an 
impact on the appearance of topics related to migration in Slovenian media. Year by year, 
Slovenian society make up their own picture about migrants and also about everything that 
comes with migration, including their religion. We cannot blame Slovenians for having bad 
impress of migrants as so of Islam. Back then, migrants were people who are crossing the 
border illegally, they were all relatively young and without any goals, they would live 
anywhere, including detention camps, just to stay and survive in this county. But today, 
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people that Slovenians still call migrants, are young, educated people, seeking for better 
living standards. They have rights and they know that, as they have the right to study and 
work in foreign countries, they also have the right to believe in any religion and rights to 
express their beliefs. So, the problem starts when people know their rights and they fought 
for them. Muslims in Slovenia know they have the right to be Muslim and to have a place 
where would they perform their religious activities. The Islamophobia problem in Slovenia 
attracts the wide public, including other European countries. How can Muslims have in any 
other country their own multiple places called mosque for performing prayers, but in 
Slovenia, they have only one and for that one, they waited so long? If we take a look on 
data, that we already mention, that the share of Muslims in Slovenia rose significantly 
between the two latest population registration; while their recorder number in 1991 was 
29,361 and their share 1.5%, according to the latest 2002, census 47,488 people or 2,4% of 
the respondents who choose a religious affiliation are of Islamic faith. This makes Islam a 
second-largest religion in a two-million country, where 58% or just over a million 
inhabitants are Catholic adherence (Górak-Sosnowska, 2011, p. 307). So, we came up with 
calculations, if 58% of inhabitants are Catholic adherence, approximately 1. 153,626 
Catholics (according to the latest 2002 census), we estimate they are 3000 Catholic 
churches in Slovenia, if we do the math, we will get 378 Catholics per a church. Using the 
same method for Muslims in Slovenia, we get a number that roughly said that for the 
current ration of Muslims, should be over 100 mosques or places for performing prayer. 
But they have only one. So where is the equality? 
 
Speaking further, we came cross on facts that anti-Muslim attitudes in Slovenia are tied 
with Islamophobia that arising after 9/11. Even though this is related to the “war on terror” 
dictum that stigmatizes as violent and dangerous all Muslims on account of a few 
extremists, the Slovenian Islamophobia originates from a different source. Rather than 
being a response to Islamic fundamentalism, it has a longer history: it is “a reaction to the 
failure of compulsive assimilation” (Dragoš, 2004, p. 11). Knowing the fact, that the greatest 
number of Muslims in Slovenia originated from Bosnia, they were also automatically 
connected with their ethnicity, because of historical position of Bosnia, as a poor country 
with low economic growth. This was common at the beginning of the emergence of 
Islamophobia, which was evolved during various discriminations acts, but after all these 
years, and after all attempts, to assimilate Muslims into the society of Slovenia, to this day 
we still have strong signs that Islamophobia is still present in Slovenia, especially if we look 
at the position of the Bosnian Muslims in social, political and economic positions.  
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4 MEDIA 
Media of mass communication are one of the main drivers of globalization and have 
become a key organizing factor in the everyday lives of people in the developed world. Yet 
mass media have existed for less than 150 years (Aldridge, 2007, p. 5). Today, the media is 
one of the main tools to use as a connection to the outside world. We can look at the media 
from two sides, one side is the side of the reader and the other side is the writers. We, as 
average readers, that is, people who have no influence on things that are published, profit 
in this way to obtain the desired information from the media. People who create media 
material, on the other hand, profit in many ways. One way is that they can manipulate the 
population with news that is not true and, on the other hand, also have the power to 
constantly publish inaccurate information because it is sponsored by a party with strong 
capital, in our case political parties. Renowned British communication theorist and 
professor Denis McQuail has been working on this topic for many years. In his 6th edition 
of McQuail’s Mass Communications Theory, he defines the media in three ways:  
 
In respect of politics, the mass media provide:  
An arena of debate and a set of channels for making policies, candidates, relevant facts and 
idea more widely known as well as providing politicians, interest groups and agents of 
government with a means of publicity and influence (McQuail, 2010, p. 4). 
 
In respect of culture, the mass media are: 
For most people the main channel of cultural representation and expression, and primary 
source of image of social reality and materials for forming and maintaining social identity. 
Everyday social life is strongly patterned by the routines of media and infused by its 
contents through the way leisure time is spend, lifestyles are influenced, conversations is 
given its topic and models of behaviour are offered for all contingencies (McQuail, 2010, p. 
4). 
 
And in respect of economic: 
The media had grown in economic value, with even larger and more international media 
corporations dominating the media market, with influence extending through sport, travel, 
leisure, food and clothing industries and with interconnections with telecommunications 
and all information-based economic sector (McQuail, 2010, pp. 4-5). 
 
Therefore, as well as allowing the communication of messages or texts between senders 
and receivers, the mass media need to be seen in terms of their public character and in 
respect of their political, cultural, social and economic importance. The extracted reading 
by McChesney (1999) below the stresses the important role that media can (and should) 
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play in ensuring the existence of a democratic society. Media professionals working in the 
media industries produce media products, which are increasingly seen as commodities to 
be bought and sold in globalized marketplace. Many of these products and texts have 
significance in the day-to-day life of many audience members in different parts of the 
globe. The texts may be a primary source of information and knowledge about the social 
world and most significantly about relationship of power. Media texts have further potency 
in the way in which cultural and political differences are constructed and defined. The 
experience of living in the modern and postmodern societies is defined primary by the very 
existence of the media. Our understanding of the media than must go further than a narrow 
technical definition of the media as the medium of communication between senders and 
receivers, or readers and writers (Devereux, 2013, S. 15).       
 
Above all, the power of the media came from observing the effect of the media itself. The 
emergence of media as a type of information for citizens had many benefits for both 
citizens and people who knew how to use every situation to their advantage. The influence 
of the media on important decisions in the country, such as the election or popularity of 
certain parties, is not something that appeared yesterday in Austria or Slovenia. Namely, 
newspaper circulation in the USA peaked in 1910, although it happened a good deal later 
in Europe and other part of the world. The press was mainly founded by commercial 
advertising its content was characterized by sensational news stories and its control was 
often concentrated in the hand of powerful press “barons”. It was yet further reinforced 
by what happened in the Soviet Union and later in Nazi Germany, where the media were 
pressed into the service of propaganda on behalf of ruling party elites (McQuail, 2010, pp. 
52-53). 
 
Today, one of the most important things is that society needs to be able to distinguish true 
information from false information. One of the important things is that a person must view 
information from an objective standpoint and not allow certain media to influence his or 
her primary thinking about certain things. Although it seems harmless that people have 
been given access to various sources of information these days, on the other hand, it is 
difficult to have their opinion without being influenced by the media, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
4.1 ROLE AND IMPACT OF MEDIA ON SOCIETY 
Speaking in general, consciously or unconsciously, the media has a powerful influence on 
human thinking. Today, the media is one of the easiest ways to educate, inform, or simply 
find out about the current happenings and it is just a click away. This is electronic way of 
obtaining information, beside this, media can be also in print version, including: 
newspapers, articles, books, etc. Furthermore, among young people, social media have the 
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biggest influence today. Today, almost everyone has access to a private social profile, which 
means that everyone has access to express their opinions, regardless of whether or not it 
is valid, which leads to "too much freedom of speech”.  
 
With the advent of new communication mediums, the frequency of media use is also 
increasing. Today a large population of our country uses communication tools on an hourly 
basis. Youth spends most of their time on social media exploring themselves on their 
interest fields. The young population of our country spends most of his or her time on the 
social sites like Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google + which includes 
the posting and sharing of content according to the interest and need of the social media 
user. The frequency of using media depends on the reach and access pattern of 
communication mediums (Singh & Pandey, 2007, p. 131). 
 
One of the differences between televisions and social reporting (especially on social media) 
is that social networks have progressed so rapidly that they have skipped some of the 
stages that television or radio broadcasting had to go through. Social media has adapted 
so quickly to other forms of reporting such as television, radio, magazine reporting, etc. in 
a way that is most appealing to the younger generation. Everything has become accelerated 
and at your fingertips, which makes important information equal to other irrelevant ones 
and does not allow them to float "to the surface". 
 
How do the media generally affect people, especially when making important life decisions 
such as education, work, family, or even vote in elections, we only see the impact when we 
reduce the use of media in our daily lives. Although many studies have been conducted on 
how the media primarily affect the psychological state of a person, the complete cessation 
of the use of the media is not a solution, but simply a choice of information that we 
ourselves want to obtain. In our work, one of the goals is to find out how the media affect 
the population of Austria and Slovenia by imposing information on them with specific goals. 
4.1.1. The role of the media in Austria 
When it comes to the population of Austria and one of the problems in the country, namely 
Islam and the rise of Islamophobia, the Austrian government plans professionally how to 
communicate with the media. Everything is planned in advance, when and to whom the 
information will be delivered, with the aim of shaping the public discourse. Government 
adoption and political approval of anti-Muslim law in Austria are reflected in media 
coverage and therefore by spreading hate speech in public newspapers and it leads only to 
increasing the attacks on Muslims and their religion. 
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Islamophobic attacks in Austria increased significantly compared to last year, according to 
a report published by an organization in Austria. A total of 309 attacks against Muslims in 
2017 rose by 74 percent to 540 in 2018, according to the Anti-Muslim Racism Report 2018 
released by Dokustelle, an organization that documents cases of Islamophobia and anti-
Muslim racism. Attacks against Muslim women account for 83 percent of the total number 
of Islamophobic attacks in Austria, according to the report. Most of the racist attacks were 
carried out on digital media with 53 percent, the report said. This rate was 31 percent in 
public places, five percent in educational institutions and three percent in working life, it 
added (Kiyagan, 2019). 
 
As we can see, using media is one of the common ways of expressing hate speech. Almost 
everyone today has access to the Internet, so almost everyone has access to publish any 
content that is full of hate speech. Content published by one person can be removed, but 
when it comes to the state-run tabloid with the highest circulation per day, we know that 
there is something more than just hate speech. This is exactly the example of Austria's 
Kronen Zeitung newspaper, which published in 2017 a newspaper with the cover "Close 
Borders for Muslims" (Kronen Zeitung, 2017).  
 
Beside Kronen Zeitung, various Right-wing media, such as outlet Wochenblick published 
various articles on topic Islamization of society. The article states, “Rehabilitation in Austria: 
Woman Has to Submit to Islamic Prayer Times” (Wochenblick, 2018). (see Picture 2)  
 
The Oberösterreichischen Nachrichten (engl. Upper Austrian Daily) reported to be shocked 
that mosques were still open, thus blindly following the government’s propaganda (Ichner, 
2018). Some journalists argued not only to ban the hijab in kindergarten, but also for 
teachers, since the hijab can “question social achievements” (Neues Volksblatt, 2018). The 
Kronen Zeitung also argued that a mosque belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood (Budin, 
2018), which was not true. The author Necla Kelek also supported the government’s hijab 
ban (Kelek, 2018). Nina Scholz defended the government in Der Standard and argued why 
a ban of the hijab was necessary, while the ban of the Jewish kippah was not (Scholz, 2018). 
 
Other media outlets such as Biber gave a voice to Muslims, showing the kind of 
discrimination they are suffering under the current circumstances (Stanić & Mohamed, 
2018). Mosaik interviewed teachers to give a picture contrary to the one spread by Susanne 
Wiesinger (Draxler & Ahmed, 2018). Also, political scientists, Muslim and Christian 
theologians, religious studies scholars, anthropologists, scholars of law, historians and a 
scholar of Jewish philosophy were given space to dissent with the widespread anti-Muslim 
policies (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2019, pp. 115-116). 
 
20 
 
All of these newspapers are sponsored by right-wingers, which means that they decide who 
will, what will and where will news be published and with that they have an impact on 
society and shape their thoughts. So, this means that right-wingers, in collaboration with 
certain media, have an indirect power to decide who people will vote for in the election. 
 
Picture 1: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Kronen Zeitung 
 
Source: (Kronen Zeitung, 2017) 
Picture 2: An example of hate speech in a newspaper Wochenblick 
 
Source: (Bayraklı & Hafez, 2019) 
4.1.2.  The role of the media in Slovenia 
When we talk about the media in Slovenia, and if we look back at 2016 on the emergence 
of the so-called migrant crisis, the fear of Islamization, with the most prominent 
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Islamophobic content, was the Reporter journal and therefore, this journal published 
various articles that were of a discriminatory nature. 
 
The article, which contains hate speech, is signed by J.B., and bears the quotation that 
“Islam is a criminal ideology that deserves to be included in the same category as Nazism, 
fascism and communism – It is contrary to the principles of European law, and it should be, 
like its predecessors, overcome - the West must crush Islam if it wants to survive.” The 
article was published on the website of the Reporter on 23 May 2016 (Bayraklı & Hafez, 
European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). The same author develops similar 
claims in an article entitled “Ljubljana on the way to Islamization: a crescent moon is fixed 
on the minaret.’’ The article was published in the Reporter on 30 May 2016. In the article, 
texts owner writes that the Ljubljana Islamic Religious and Cultural Centre will become “a 
hotbed of radicalization and terrorism” (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 
2016, 2017, p. 540). 
 
After several months, the same writer also publishes a third article in the same journal, 
entitled "Meet Ljubljana's First Sharia Ghetto?" and is subtitled "A new residential 
neighbourhoods will grow near the mosque. Experience from Europe shows that such 
neighbourhoods are populated mostly by Muslims and are where terrorists find shelter." 
This article talks about the expansion, in the future, of the Muslim population in Ljubljana, 
which will allegedly terrorize the people of this city to force them to embrace Islam and its 
lifestyle (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). Beside the 
journal the Reporter, the right-wing newspaper Demokracija has a news chapter entitled 
“Migrations” (slo. migracije) under which they publish various material and news regarding 
migration and migrants and depict them as a violent threat to Slovenia. They represent 
migration as an Islamic invasion (Demokracija, 2018). They spoke about fictitious violence 
against Muslim women's children and forcing Muslim rituals, also about illegal arrivals of 
migrants from war zones and etc. 
 
Beside this, on 29 August 2018, they publish cover which shows a bust of a white woman 
grabbed by black hands, with the caption on the cover:” Along with migrants comes a 
culture of rape to Slovenia”. (see Picture 5) This is not only about the fact that the cover 
picture objectively shows racial hatred, because rape is associated with black migrants, but 
also about the perception of women in these societies. In additional, the cover hints at the 
arrival of migrants with their rape culture. What then should an average Slovenian think of 
this so-called culture of rape of migrants coming from Islamic countries? Nothing but fear, 
trembling and disgust for such Muslims as for that culture and religion called Islam. This 
cover is unfortunately just one of many attempts to disparage Islam and portray this 
religion as perverted, full of violence, bloody killing, raping, belittling women, and so on, 
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leading to an increase in Islamophobia among Slovenes and thus increasing the rate of 
Islamophobia in the country, with help from the media. 
 
Picture 3: An example of Islamophobia on the front page of Slovenian Democracy newspaper 
 
Source: (Demokracija, 2018) 
Nova24TV’s (Slovenian right-wing news media) columnist Bernard Brščič wrote about the 
idea of affiliation of Islam in Europe, more precisely about the incompatibility of Islam and 
Europe. Namely, the original idea of Islam in Europe was stated by German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, and that Islam should be an integral part of both German culture and 
European culture. Brščič responded like this: 
 
“Islam does not belong to Germany, does not belong to Europe and does not 
belong to Slovenia. European Islam is a contradiction in terms. Islam and 
Europe are separate and incompatible concepts in values. […] Europeanness 
means denial of Islam. [...] Muslims do not demand subordination from 
themselves and their associates, but from all of us. [...] Islam is consequently in 
war with all great religions, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. [...] 
The freedom that we enjoy and is guaranteed by the liberal-democratic system 
is threatened by Islam. This is not just about pursuing the ideals of the 
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Enlightenment, such as secularism, freedom of speech, democratic decision-
making, equality of men and women, the arbitrariness of sexual orientation, 
but also about trivial things, such as the right to enjoy pork sausages, ham or 
Kranjska sausage, drink refošk or cviček, or the rightto freely stray dogs 
accompanied by uncovered women” (Brščič, 2018). 
 
In addition to various media reports, websites are also flooded with hate speech. Some of 
these pages are: Radical Ljubljana (slo. Radikalna Ljubljana); Stop Islamisation of Slovenia 
(slo. Stop islamizaciji Slovenije); Generation Identity Slovenia (slo. Generacija identitete 
Slovenija); Slovenia Secure Borders (slo. Slovenija Zavaruj Meje); Slovenian Militia (slo. 
Slovenska milica); and We do not want refugees and migrants in Slovenia, we do not want 
a mosque in Ljubljana (slo. Nočemo beguncev in migrantov v Sloveniji, Nočemo džamije v 
Ljubljani) (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017, p. 540). The posts 
on their Facebook pages are offensive and use images of animals, such as pigs, which are 
not allowed to be eaten in Islam. 
 
Picture 4: The example of dehumanization of Muslims on Social Networks 
 
Source: (Bayraklı & Hafez, European Islamophobia report 2016, 2017) 
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5 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN AUSTRIA 
In this part of the diploma thesis, we turn to a practical example of media influence using 
the analysis of the 2017 Austrian parliamentary elections. Specifically, our aim is to show 
how much politicians have appeared in the media, how many people, potential voters, 
watched the elections, and how they used the media and Islamophobic content in the 
media to win elections and spread fear and trembling among the Austrian population in 
order to present their party as ideal as a safeguard for the Austrian people against Islam 
and Islamization. Before moving on to the practical part, let us briefly explain how the 
political world in Austria functions. 
5.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF AUSTRIA 
Austria is a democratic republic. The territory of the Federal Republic consists of nine 
federal states or provinces (ger. Bundesland, Land; plural: Bundesländer, Länder). Vienna 
is the federal capital and the seat of the supreme federal authorities. Since 1995, Austria is 
a member state of the European Union. Five political parties are currently represented in 
the Austrian Parliament: the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), the Social Democratic Party of 
Austria (SPÖ), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Greens and the NEOS (The Austrian 
Federal Government, 2020). 
 
For our analysis, we will use only three main winning parties in Austrian Parliamentary 
election in 2017, so a brief idea of them: 
1. ÖVP- The Christian conservative Austrian People’s Party- with more than 600.000 
members the Austrian People's Party is the biggest party in Austria. In six 
associations (youth, women, entrepreneurs, employees, farmers, senior citizens), 
organized in nine province and 116 district branches, they work for the party in all 
2098 communities of Austria (ÖVP, 2019). 
2. FPÖ- The Freedom Party of Austria- is a right-wing populist party in Austria, which 
is represented in the National Council, in all nine state parliaments and many local 
councils. She describes herself as a representative of the "Third Camp" and sees 
herself in the heritage of the national-liberal value system of the bourgeois-
democratic revolution of 1848 (FPÖ, 2019). 
3. SPÖ- The Social Democratic Party of Austria has been fighting since the beginning 
for a better life for the people. A party with a wide offer for all who want a fair, 
social and democratic Austria. For us, there are so many in the centre who it does 
not always have easy in life - not the few who can do it (SPÖ, 2019). 
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In a manner of election, all political institutions established by the Constitution derive 
their powers either directly or indirectly from elections by secret, personal and equal 
ballot. Austrian citizens elect the:  
- the National Assembly (ger. Nationalrat, the people’s chamber of Parliament) – 
every five years, 
- the Provincial Parliament (ger. Landtag, Parliament of a Province) – every five 
or six years,  
- the Municipal Council (EU citizens resident in the municipality can also vote) – 
every five or six years,  
- the Austrian Members of the European Parliament (citizens of other EU 
countries with their main residence in Austria have the right to vote)  
- The Federal President – every six years. (The Austrian Federal Government, 
2020) 
 
Other instruments of democracy are the referendum or plebiscite (ger. Volksbefragung, 
Volksabstimmung, Volksbegehren). All Austrians (and some citizens of other EU member 
states) who reach age 16 before the appointed date can vote (The Austrian Federal 
Government, 2020). 
5.1.1.  The Parliament 
The Austrian Parliament consists of two chambers: The National Assembly (ger. 
Nationalrat) and the Federal Council (ger. Bundesrat). The National Assembly is the main 
legislative body. The preparation and implementation of legislation takes place in the 
Federal Government or in the Provincial Governments. Legislative tasks are carried out at 
federal level by the National Assembly in conjunction with the Federal Council. The Federal 
Council represents the interests of the provinces in Parliament. Provincial Assemblies (ger. 
Landtage) represent the interests of citizens in the individual provinces. Each federal 
province is administered by a Provincial Government, which is headed by a Provincial 
Governor (ger. Landeshauptmann) elected by the respective Provincial Assembly (The 
Austrian Federal Government, 2020). 
5.2  RESULTS OF AUSTRIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2017 
Table 1 shows the results in the 2017 parliamentary elections showing that for the first time 
since 2002, the ÖVP became the strongest party with a vote share of 31.5% (+7.5 
percentage points compared to 2013). The FPÖ achieved its second-best election result 
ever, winning 26% (+5.5 percentage points), and it only marginally lost the second place to 
the SPÖ. Combined, the ÖVP and FPÖ reached a comfortable majority of 57.4%, securing 
the largest vote share for parties of the center-right and radical-right in Austria. Both 
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parties gained votes in every Bundesland, with the largest gains in Carinthia, the region 
formerly governed by Jörg Haider, deceased leader of the FPÖ and later BZÖ. The SPÖ 
retained its all-time low vote share of 2013 with 26.9% (+0.04 percentage points), 
remaining the strongest party only in the traditional strongholds of the Bundesländer 
Vienna and Burgenland (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018). 
 
Table 1: Results of Austrian Parliamentary Election 2017 
PARTY SEATS WON VOTES VOTE SHARE 
Austrian People's Party 
(ÖVP) 
62 1,595,526 31,5% 
Austrian Social 
Democratic Party (SPÖ) 
52 1,361,746 26,9% 
Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPÖ) 
51 1,316,442 26% 
Source: (Election Guide, 2017) 
5.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2017 
The issues of immigration, border control, anti-Islam, and the related topic was a major 
ideology of all three parties. Firstly, the victorious ÖVP party with 31% of vote share, led by 
Sebastian Kurz, can attribute his victory to his anti-immigration and anti-Muslim campaign, 
which blended perfectly with media content full of enemy stereotypes. Secondly, SPÖ has 
been one of the main backers of the FPÖ party in supporting the law to ban Muslim veils 
by covering their faces and tightening their immigration status. We can all agree that 
Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) played really well in these elections. Namely, Kurz claimed during the 
election in 2015 that Islam is part of Austria (and we have proof of that, see Picture 5) that 
immigrants are an important part of Austrian society that helps the economy, etc. but the 
ÖVP party in 2015 election won a small percentage (24 percent). So, during the 2017 
elections, Kurz had a new ideology, which is, surprisingly, almost identic to an ideology of 
FPÖ party (winning party in 2015), fight against “political Islam”. 
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Picture 5: FPÖosters as a fight against Islam 
 
Source: (FPÖ, 2019) 
The main question now is, what role did the media play in all these results? Now that we 
know, which goals did have these campaigns, now we will show what kind of tools did they 
use, and how often that they showed up on media. Firstly, the 2017 election campaign was 
marked by various changes. Even though TV advertisement of elections campaigns in 
Austria are legally banned, yet SPÖ announced that they will invest a significant amount of 
money on TV spots (statistics show that was 18% funds from the campaign fund). 
Furthermore, this campaign switches from posters around the country and instead invest 
in media and online tools. They use social media as an established means of campaigning. 
Each of the candidates had their private account on Facebook and above all, parties 
comprehensively used YouTube by releasing more than 500 videos in six campaign weeks. 
The public broadcaster ORF (ger.  Österreichischer Rundfunk) continues to dominate the 
television market and played a major role in promoting the aims of these parties.  ORF, 
which operates four TV channels, reached ten times as many viewers in 2015 as the most 
popular private channel, Puls 4, which is owned by the ProSiebenSat.1 media company. 
ORF is subject to political influence because the parties, via the broadcaster's board of 
trustees, are involved in the selection of its chairman (Press Freedom Index, 2018). 
 
TV debates between pairs of top candidates are well-established events in Austrian 
campaigns and raise extensive attention among voters and journalists  (Plasser, Fritz, & 
Günther, 2010, pp. 193-240). In 2017, ten pairwise debates organised by the public 
broadcasting company attracted on average more than 700,000 viewers (11% of the 
electorate). More than 1.2 million viewers (19% of the electorate) watched the final round 
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with all top candidates (OFR, 2017). It was the most extensive reporting so far that the ORF 
offered before a National Council election - with more than 72 hours of live interviews, 
analyses, TV discussions, reports and contributions on ORF television alone and around 500 
reports in a total length of just under eleven hours to choose from in the ZiB programs in 
ORF 1 and ORF 2. Therefore, all citizens had the opportunity to be informed of these 
debates both in the public (ORF) as well on the two major private channels (Puls 4 and ATV). 
 
"Round of Top Candidates" alone reached up to 1.409 million people interested in politics 
(on average 1.211 million with 41 percent market share, 39 percent in the target group 12-
49 and 36 percent among 12- to 29-year-olds were there live via ORF 2) and was thus the 
most successful round since 2006 and by far the most-watched election 17 program on 
Austrian television (OFR, 2017), this means that 29 of the 30 broadest-reaching TV election 
formats for National Council election 2017 were shown on ORF. Of the 100 television 
minutes used by the public on Austrian TV channels for the election, 74 were attributable 
to ORF TV programs. More than two million Austrians saw the election duels exclusively on 
ORF (and none of the commercial competitors). With its election 17 confrontations, ORF 
also had the absolutely most viewers in all target groups. 
 
The public interest in the run-up to election 17 was enormous: record numbers reached 
the "summer talks" with Tarek Leitner, which were held for the first time in an election 
year, at the beginning of ORF area code reporting. On average, 782,000 viewers saw the 
five debates with a 28 percent market share; in the young target group of 12-49 years, the 
market share was 21 percent (OFR, 2017), this made the “Summer Talks” 2017 the most 
viewed in the history of the series. The “summer talk” with Sebastian Kurz was the most 
viewed “summer talk” ever. 
 
Table 2: The" summer talk" in chronological order 
PARTY 
REPRESENTATIVE 
PARTY NUMBER OF VIEWERS 
PERECENT OF MARKET 
SHARE 
Heinz-Christian Strache FPÖ 813.000 28% 
Sebastian Kurz ÖVP 1.073.000 35% 
Christian Kern SPÖ 943.000 30% 
Source: (OFR, 2017) 
From this we can see, in fact, how much the citizens were interested in elections 2017 and 
how many potential voters attracted party representatives with their goals and promises 
during the debates and public appearance. Up to 1.409 million Austrians saw the elections 
17 “confrontations” with an average market share of up to 41 percent (OFR, 2017). 
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Table 3: TV confrontations in chronological order 
PARTY 
REPRESENTATIVE 
PARTY NUMBER OF VIEWERS 
PERECENT OF MARKET 
SHARE 
Kern – Strache SPÖ-FPÖ 887.000 27% 
Kurz – Strache ÖVP-FPÖ 904.000 28% 
Kern – Kurz SPÖ-ÖVP 970.000 31% 
Source: (OFR, 2017) 
Elections 17 was also a hit on social media in ORF: Facebook has more than 6 million video 
views and more than 1.2 million interactions to choose from on ORF's Facebook pages.  
What does this all tell us? All the goals that these parties had anti-Muslim, anti-
immigration, border protection, ban on wearing burqa for Muslim women, closing Muslim 
kindergartens, running Islamic centres, all these goals were stated on public television. All 
of these plans were heard throughout Austria and again most Austrians agreed to these 
goals. According to the Election Guide, the turnout rate was 79%, so which means 
5,120,881 Austrians votes on these elections (Election Guide, 2017). 1,595,526 Austrians 
voted in favor of the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), 1,361,746 Austrians voted in favor of 
the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and 1,316,442 Austrians gave their vote for 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Although their ideologies were not backed up with strong 
evidence at the time, the parties used the media during the election as a constant reminder 
that life could be better for all Austrians if these parties' proposals were adopted, if we cast 
our vote for a better tomorrow, if we rely on these parties that in the future will save us 
from so-called political Islam, Muslims and their beliefs. And they obviously succeeded. 
Consciously or unconsciously, the media has a powerful influence on us and the media is 
one of the easiest ways to manipulate with humans, whether we admit it to ourselves or 
not.  
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6 IMPACT OF MEDIA ON ISLAMOPHOBIA IN SLOVENIA 
Using a similar approach as we did for analysing of Parliamentary election in Austria 2017, 
we will use on example of media influencing on results of Parliamentary election in Slovenia 
2018 by displacing appearance of political parties during the election on TV and Radio and 
how it affected the attitude towards migrants, therefore, Muslims coming to the country. 
6.1 POLITICAL SYSTEM OF SLOVENIA    
Slovenia is a parliamentary democratic republic with a proportional electoral system. In 
Slovenia power is vested in the people. All adult citizens of the Republic of Slovenia have 
the right to vote for representatives of the people in general, multi-party and free elections. 
Power is divided into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The holder of the 
legislative branch is the parliament, which consists of the National Assembly and the 
National Council. Executive power is vested in the Government and judicial power is 
separated from both the legislative and the executive powers (Government 
Communication Office (GOV), 2019). 
 
For our analysis, we will use only three main winning parties in Slovenian Parliamentary 
election in 2018, so a brief idea of them: 
1. SDS- The Slovenian Democratic party- The key objective of the SDS is to create a 
new quality of life, more democracy, respect for human rights and mutual respect, 
economic efficiency, freedom and solidarity. The SDS stands for the society of free 
and active individuals, which accepts and protects the functioning of the free 
market while alleviating its social consequences (SDS, 2018). 
2. SD- The Social Democrats- has a tradition of more than 150 years. It emerged as a 
political movement for social and political rights workers. Its key values are 
solidarity, justice and equality of all people. It has therefore been a leading ally of 
women in the fight for their political and social equality and a key political force in 
promoting universal human rights (SD, 2018). 
3. LMS- The List of Marjan Sarec- wants to shape the future of the Slovenian state for 
the sake of the people. For the common good, for intergenerational coexistence, 
for Slovenian security, for nature conservation and for a clear view of the future 
(LMS, 2018). 
6.1.1. The Parliament  
The Slovenian Parliament is bicameral, composed of the National Assembly (slo. Državni 
zbor) and the National Council (slo. Državni svet). In the National Assembly, there are 88 
representatives of political parties and two representatives of the Italian and Hungarian 
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national communities, elected by the people to represent their interests. Members of the 
National Council nominated and elected by different interest groups in society represent 
organised social interests and the interests of local communities. The National Assembly 
adopts amendments to the Constitution, laws, national programmes, declarations and 
resolutions. It also adopts its rules of procedure and the state budget, ratifies international 
treaties and calls referendums. The deputies in the National Assembly elect the Prime 
Minister and Ministers, the President and Vice-Presidents of the National Assembly and, 
on the proposal of the President of the Republic, also the Judges of the Constitutional 
Court, the Governor of the Bank of Slovenia and the Human Rights Ombudsman. There are 
40 members of the National Council, of whom four are representatives of employers, four 
representatives of employees, four representatives of farmers, craftsmen and independent 
professions, six representatives of non-commercial activities and 22 representatives of 
local interests (Government Communication Office (GOV), 2019). 
6.2 RESULTS OF SLOVENIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2018 
From Table 4 we can see results of the Slovenian Parliamentary election in 2018, where we 
can see that the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) won with 24,92% of vote share headed 
by Janez Jansa, one of several Slovenian politicians who managed to hold the position for 
over 20 years. In the second place is a party with 12,60% of vote share or precisely 112,250 
votes (double less than the winning party) The List of Marjan Sarec (LMS) in the leading 
position with Marjan Sarec. This party was founded in 2014, one month before the last 
national elections 2014 in June and has failed to reach the top 7 "winning" parties and now 
is in second place. In third place is a party with 9,93% of vote share, party named Social 
Democrats headed wit Dejan Zidan. Although this party ranks third, it boasts almost twice 
as many votes as it did in the last national election (5,98%) (Election Guide, 2018). 
 
Table 4: Results of Slovenian Parliamentary Election 2018 
PARTY 
PARTY 
REPRESENTATIVE 
SEATS WON VOTES VOTE SHARE 
Slovenian 
Democratic 
Party (SDS) 
Janez Jansa 25 222,042 24,92% 
The List of 
Marjan Sarec 
(LMS) 
Marjan Sarec 13 112,250 12,60% 
Social Democrats 
(SD) 
Dejan Zidan 10 88,524 9,93% 
Source: (Election Guide, 2018) 
 
 
32 
 
6.2.1. The impact of media on results of Parliamentary election 2018 
In the election campaign, some representatives from the winning party SDS used illiberal 
rhetoric on migration and civil society issues. SDS also used huge posters warning of a 
migrant invasion (see Picture 6) and promising to not allow a single migrant to enter the 
country. However, Janez Janša (SDS) himself played the role of an open-minded and 
accessible politician, offering hands of cooperation to everyone. In public appearances, he 
demonstrated great skills and experience, which the newcomers and many of his second 
league competitors simply did not have. By professional standards, the SDS campaign was 
much ahead of the others (Lovec, 2018, p. 5). 
 
Picture 6: Slovenian Democratic Party on Migration 
 
Source: (SDS, 2018) 
 
Translation: Left-wings claim migration is a good thing. We say they are a danger. 
 
Beside SDS posters, we already mention newspaper Demokracija and the statement by 
Nova24TV columnist about the incompatibility of Islam and Europe, especially in Slovenia, 
the questions are, what is the relationship between this type of media and politicians in 
the 2018 elections? 
 
We are aware of the fact that political parties are dependent on the media and that they 
represent the fastest link between politics and society. As we have already presented, 
television played a key role in the 2017 Austrian elections, because television is a form of 
media that is understandable to anyone from illiterate, old people to children. In this case 
of Slovenian, the media law does impose rules aiming at the fair representation of political 
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viewpoints in news and informative programs on PSM (Public service media) channels and 
services; however, there is no designated body with effective enforcement powers that 
would overlook this representation. (Milosavljevic, Gerjevic, & Petkovic, 2018). In this 
specific case we present how often political parties appeared on TV during election 2018. 
 
It is a well-known fact that the SDS manages the Nova24TV TV station and their content, 
which we are already familiar with, and also has the editorial support of the political journal 
Report and Demokracija, whose content we are also familiar with, and their attitude 
towards Islam and migration. And all three belong to the national level.  Namely, before 
the Parliamentary election on 12 March of 2018 agency Parsifal- which does market 
research and opinion polling, did a survey for Nova24TV that shows that the vast majority 
of voters, more than 70% tend to vote for SDS, the party that allegedly has a program with 
concrete solutions. This is a logically concluded overblown analysis, as in this analysis more 
than 70% of citizens voted for the SDS party, while true parliamentary results on 3 June of 
2018 show that only 24.92% of citizens voted for this party. This was an attempt of a 
psychological nature, showing the society in advance the results of how the majority voted, 
in order to give people a picture of the quality of that party since more than 70% of citizens 
would vote for that party. A similar model was used in Mexico during the corrupt 
government. What is important to emphasize here is that it was precisely the new 24TV 
that insisted on such an analysis and thus published it. 
 
In this case, generally, television and radio play a major role, as a form of media, as the 
main source of information during the election. In addition to television coverage, regular 
elections were broadcast on Radio Slovenia mainly on the First Program - PRVI. Radio 
Slovenia has broadcasted five confrontations, which lasted an hour and a half and were 
broadcast live every Wednesday at 5 pm. Every Wednesday at 5 pm, various topics were 
discussed, from foreign policy, migrations to solving problems in Slovenian health. Debates 
of the parties could also be watched live via Facebook. Also, at 11.15 am every day, the 
First Program – PRVI announced the presentation of candidates and parties that will run in 
all constituencies. 
 
Fresh results of public opinion polls were published every Friday, and at 4.30 pm on the 
First Program - PRVI, there was also an analysis of the candidates' activities from last week. 
The claims made by the candidates in the confrontations and presentations were also 
verified by the journalists of the Program PRVI of Radio Slovenia and confronted with facts 
and data.     
Regarding television, Television Slovenia (RTV Slovenia) broadcast TV debates in the 2018 
elections between presidents of all parties, parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties. 
The first, inaugural debate, was on Monday, May 7 of 2018 at 8 pm, when the campaign 
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also officially started on RTV Slovenia. Until June 1st, TV debates were held between party 
presidents, between parliamentary parties, interview with representatives of non-
parliamentary parties, debates between non-parliamentary parties, interview with 
representatives of parliamentary parties. 
 
Table 5: RADIO confrontations in chronological order 
DATE DEBATES TIME DURATION 
9. May 2018 
Confrontation of 
Presidents of all 
parties, 
parliamentary and 
non-parliamentary 
5pm 1,5h 
16. May 2018 
Confrontation of 
representatives of 
parliamentary 
parties 
5pm 1,5h 
23. May 2018 
Debate between 
representatives of 
non-parliamentary 
parties 
5pm 1,5h 
30. May 2018 
Confrontation of 
parliamentarians 
5pm 1,5h 
31. May 2018 
Last debate of the 
Presidents of all 
parties 
5pm 1,20h 
Source: (RTV SLO, 2018) 
Table 6: TV confrontations in chronological order 
DATE DEBATES TIME CHANNEL 
7. May 2018 
Presidents of all parties, 
parliamentary and non-
parliamentary parties 
8pm TV SLO 1 
17. May 2018 Parliamentary parties 8pm TV SLO 1 
24. May 2018 
Non- parliamentary 
parties 
8pm TV SLO 1 
28. May 2018 Parliamentary parties 8pm TV SLO 1 
31. May 2018 
The last debate of 
Presidents of all parties 
8pm TV SLO 1 
Source: (RTV SLO, 2018) 
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As we presented in Slovenia at the time of the elections, the media were very aware of the 
parties and candidates. In addition to TV debates between parties, they also featured 
political activities, television commercials about parties, and political party self-
representation. Why we take TV debates as an example of the impact on Islamophobia, 
especially in the time of election 2018? Well, during TV debates where candidates discuss 
among themselves, and in those moments of rapid discussion, they must be aware that 
they are responsible for their own answers, which should be made with reflection. One 
such example is the issue of foreign policy. Although the problem of migration in Slovenia 
is not as prevalent as in Austria, nonetheless, party representatives fought against mass 
migration and the spread of radical Islamization. The winning party SDS, during elections, 
was the first party to propose the establishment of surveillance in border areas. SDS 
deputies, during TV debates, also point out that migrant flows today represent the greatest 
security challenge for both Slovenia and the European Union. That is the only reason why 
the Government of the Republic of Slovenia should have prepared measures and solutions 
regarding migration flows, and the parliament has the right and duty to get acquainted with 
them. They also draw attention to the fact that the migrant crisis in the second half of 2015 
and in the first months of 2016 hit the Republic of Slovenia completely unprepared. 
According to Members, this situation must not happen again. 
 
Did all of this have an impact on Slovenians to go out and vote and how that reflected on 
their attitudes towards Muslims? Although, no data is available of the TV and Radio 
consumption in the elections 2018, summing up the facts, that in Slovenia live around 2 
million people, according to the Election Guide, the turnout rate in the parliamentary 
elections in Slovenia was 52%, more precisely 901,457 votes (Election Guide, 2018). So, 
comparing this number with a number of votes just for winning party SDS, which was 
222,042 (Election Guide, 2018), we can confirm the fact that SDS had some impact on 
Slovenians, along with their marketing campaign. They managed to convince the majority 
of Slovenes to go and vote, and therefore vote for their anti-migration policy and thus 
contributed to increasing the level of Islamophobia in the country, gaining a vote for such 
a party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
7 SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN 
AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA 
Firstly, it is important to say that Islam is present in every European country. No country 
has a perfect system, but each has a different response to the presence of Islam in the 
state. Here is important to reflect on facts how these two counties behave towards Islam 
and how that reflected especially during elections in both countries.  
 
Firstly, if we reflect on the legalizations of Islam in both countries, Austria legally recognized 
Islam as a state religion in 1912 and in 1979 it acknowledged the Islamic Religious 
Community in Austria. On the contrary, in Slovenia Islam is still not legally recognized, but 
there was established Islamic Community in Slovenia in the 1960s. When it comes to 
registered mosques, Austria till now boasts over 250 registered mosques and above all, 
four mosques exist with minarets, while Slovenia, after more than 50 years, in 2015 has 
allowed the Muslim community to build the first mosque in Ljubljana with a minaret that 
cannot be higher than 40 m. Although Austria had a good foundation for the stability of 
Islam in the country, fears of a sharp rise in Muslims in the country forced the government 
to change the 1912 Islamic law, by introducing new rules for Muslims and discriminating 
them comparing to other religions, in a particular, ban of receiving founding outside of 
Austria, aiming precisely at Turkey and Saudi Arabia, quite opposite, other religions are 
more than welcome to receive founding from Moscow, United State and etc. Meanwhile, 
in Slovenia, Muslims are still in the phase of integrating into Slovenian society. 
 
When we talk about the legal forms of states and the elections themselves, type of regime 
in Austria is Representative democracy and with that type of government is Semi-
presidential representative democracy. On the other side, Slovenia is Democratic Republic 
and form of government is parliamentary system. If we observe situation during elections, 
considering the fact that Austria and Slovenia are border neighbours, they had a lot in 
common during the Parliamentary elections. Due to the migrant crisis in the second half of 
2015 and in the first months of 2016, that hits both of these countries, the issue of closing 
borders in both states was represented. Both countries had a strong anti-Islamic and anti-
migration policy during the election campaign, the difference is that Austria had already 
taken some sanctions such as deceiving mosques, Islamic kindergartens, banning the 
wearing of the niqab, etc. 
One of the main differences is that Austria has taken a much stricter approach in the fight 
against “political Islam,” and Muslims in general, is that the Muslim population in Austria 
makes up 8% of the total population. They have reached a point where anti-immigration 
policies are not effective because Muslims “multiply” within state borders. The government 
then turned to anti-Islamic policies, with the aim of manipulating already arrived Muslims 
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and their young generations. While on the other hand, Slovenia does not have such a huge 
number of Muslims, but with its anti-immigration policy it fights against the arrival of new 
Muslims. 
 
As a student who has studied and lived in both countries, from my point of view I can say 
that both countries are on the one hand very similar and on the other very different. First 
of all, it is important to say that in both countries the education systems are separated from 
political, legal, social and other interests, in the education system the focus is on education, 
not on individuals. Regarding the differences and similarities in the field of media, I can say 
from work experience in Austria, that spreading hatred and promoting violence on social 
networks, in general towards any religion and nation, is severely punished. As for Slovenia, 
which is also legally regulated, any discrimination on the basis of religion, origin, skin color 
and race, is contrary to the Constitution of Slovenia, which present the highest legal act. 
So, both countries are legally regulated. The problem arises when the wrong things, such 
as tolerating Islamophobia or even inducing Islamophobic acts, come from the people in 
power. People who are involved in politics or are employed in public administration, they 
must perform their work independently within and on the basis of the Constitution, laws 
and other regulations and according to the rules of the profession. Here is a link, which 
indicates the knowledge we gained as students during our studies, that every work, 
including work on the Diploma Thesis, must be done impartially and without the influence 
of personal interests. For me personally, it was very challenging to remain neutral, because 
as a person belonging to the Muslim community, it would be easy to just blame all people 
for not understanding Islam, instead of trying to explain Islam as a simple religion 
advocating peace, freedom, understanding and moderation, and with that try to encourage 
people to educate themselves about Islam first, before making any other judgment. 
 
As a conclusion, based on all evidence we presented in the thesis, we can say that both 
countries had an anti-Islamic stance, especially during the elections, and used similar 
policies to achieve their goals. Which tells us that anti-Islamic and anti-migration policies 
are the ones that have led to an increase in Islamophobia in both countries. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
One of the aims of the thesis was to bring people closer to the real picture of Islam and 
their beliefs. We wanted to show that it is not a religion that advocates violence, coercion, 
and the killing of innocent people. Only the misunderstanding of religion has led to 
Islamophobia in many European countries, including Austria and Slovenia. Our goal was to 
show whether the media had an impact on increasing the rate of Islamophobia in the 
countries. Reflecting on our data, we can clearly say that the media have a huge impact, 
generally on society, but when it comes to certain topics, such as Islamophobia, data shows 
that in both countries there are media with a high rate of discrimination and hatred 
towards Muslims. The media were used in a way to produce fear and rejection of Muslims 
by society in both countries. In order to show the general influence of the media, especially 
on the rate of Islamophobia, we presented the role of the media during the elections and 
came to the results that the media are actually one of the key factors in succeeding of 
political parties and in increasing Islamophobia in countries. Thus, the Austrian media were 
the main source of information and coverage of political campaigns, which advocated the 
fight against so-called political Islam, and thus presented their campaign as an ideal 
protector of citizens in the fight against Islam. Unfortunately, data on media consumption 
display the huge public interest which indicates that the media have not only succeeded in 
attracting viewers but have also succeeded in their ultimate goal, influencing society to 
vote for parties that support anti-Islamic acts. In the case of Slovenia, we have the same 
scenario, where right-wing political party owns certain media and use them especially in 
time of elections to promote their right-wing policy of anti-migrations and anti-Islamic 
aims. Even though we do not have data about media consumption in this case, still media 
have succeeded to influence society to vote for the party that advocates anti-migration 
policy.  
Based on all the research used on the impact of the media on Islamophobia in Austria and 
Slovenia we can confirm the first hypothesis.   
 
We confirm the hypothesis based on statistic data of media consumption during the 
elections. From data it is evident that the media succeeded to attract public interest during 
elections particularly, displaying Islamophobic content in order to achieve the victory of 
their parties. Fight against Islam and migrations were the main policies of both countries 
during elections, adding oil to the fire in countries with already existed the high rate of 
Islamophobia. 
 
We disconfirm the second hypothesis because emerge of Islamophobias did not appear 
with first generations of immigrated Muslims, but with accumulated series of hate crime, 
discrimination, and vilification towards Muslims over the years. The main reason for not 
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accepting Islam is not understanding Islam and their beliefs, which leading to appear of 
Islamophobia. 
 
As a recommendation for future work, we would state, as one of the essential things in the 
future, is the awareness of young educated people. How to attract young people to get 
involved in politics, to get involved in the public sector, and thus “refresh” the political 
world in Europe. Young people have objective opinions, and their representation reaches 
beyond the borders of the state and views Europe as a whole, which leads to easier and 
more open work of EU law monitoring. 
Also, one of the proposals not only as a reference but as a necessary thing in the political 
world is the legal regulation of pre-election announcements. Advertising using disloyal 
information, misleading advertising, and unrecognized or covert advertising can be very 
dangerous especially in times of the elections. When we say very dangerous, we mean 
misinformation circulating in the media during the election campaign, due to which people 
are unable to recognize whether they are true or not, which leads to a change in the opinion 
of individual political campaigns, and ultimately leads to the victory of certain political 
parties. The Law on Legal Regulation of Pre-Election Announcements would regulate the 
transparency and accuracy of such announcements. 
 
We hope that we manage with this diploma to clarify misconceptions about Islam and 
slightly reduce the rate of Islamophobia in the future.  
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